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ABSTRACT
This Article examines state oversight of local-government borrowing in the
United States and focuses in depth on the North Carolina model. The Article
considers (1) structures requiring prior approval before debt is issued by
local governments; (2) different forms of state-takeover and emergency-aid
provisions in case of a local-government fiscal crisis; and (3) ongoing audit
and monitoring functions. Additionally, this Article discusses the history and
structure of North Carolina’s Local Government Commission. Finally, this
Article argues that the Local Government Commission’s model of ongoing
monitoring, approval, and takeover authority is the preferable model of state
oversight, as long as its authorities are limited to ensuring sound localgovernment debt practices.
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INTRODUCTION
In his famous essay, Two Concepts of Liberty,1 English philosopher and
political theorist Isaiah Berlin described his notion of two types of liberty:
negative liberty and positive liberty.2 Negative liberty or “negative freedom”

1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
2. Id. at 122, 131.
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is the notion of being “free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with [an individual’s] activity,” or “not being interfered with by
others.”3 Positive liberty is quite different, meaning “the wish on the part of
the individual to be his own master,” or the wish “to be a subject, not an
object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are [the
individual’s] own, not by causes which affect [the individual], as it were, from
outside.”4
While Berlin’s dichotomous concepts were aimed at explaining an
individual’s freedom in a societal and political theory context, these twin
concepts analogize well to governments that wish to remain autonomous, but
which operate within a reality affected by the actions of other governments.5
The interrelated nature of local governments is particularly apparent
within local-government debt financing and fiscal practices. Local governments
sometimes design or engage in new forms of debt financing, which other units
emulate in hope of facilitating community development.6 Local governments
mimic one another’s best practices and strive to attain fiscal health.7

3. Id. at 122–23.
4. Id. at 131.
5. This is an imperfect analogy. Another analogy that could be drawn is that this interplay
between state and local governments is simply small-scale federalism. See Paul E. Peterson &
Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 251,
25354 (2012). Similarly, my analogy is used with the understanding that Berlin has his critics.
See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 18 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 1999) (“I believe that the
negative–positive distinction has served us ill in political thought.”). However, taken in the
context of a local government acting as a corporation, I would argue that regulation by a
dominant government structure (such as a state or the federal government) lends itself well to
Berlin’s twin concepts. This analogy is meant only to demonstrate the balance that a state debtoversight agency must strike in regulating local governments and ensuring stable market
conditions within the state.
6. There are many examples of the various types of local-government financing
mechanisms that have gained widespread adoption. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes,
Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56
FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004) (describing how special assessments, business improvement districts,
and other forms of financing have supplanted much of the revenue generation that was
previously created by local property taxes).
7. See generally KARL NOLLENBERGER ET AL., ICMA, EVALUATING FINANCIAL
CONDITION: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 2003) (providing local
governments with advice and measurement tools to determine fiscal solvency); Ken W. Brown,
The 10-Point Test of Financial Condition: Toward an Easy-to-Use Assessment Tool for Smaller
Cities, GOV’T FIN. REV., Dec. 1993, at 21, 22, available at http://lgc.uwex.edu/Finance/
Inservices/2011/kenneth%20brown-Ten-point-test.pdf (describing ten key ratios for predicting
fiscal solvency for a smaller city); William C. Rivenbark et al., Communicating Financial
Condition to Elected Officials in Local Government, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2009, at 4, 5, http://
sogpubs.unc.edu//electronicversions/pg/pgfal09/article1.pdf (describing a fiscal-condition
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Beyond sharing techniques for budgeting and borrowing, local
governments are common participants in a broader marketplace of localgovernment bonds.8 This means that one local government’s debtmanagement practices may significantly impact perceptions of the localgovernment bond market, affect the cost of debt that other local governments
may obtain,9 and may also affect other local governments’ general access to
credit (as was the case in Orange County, California, in the mid-1990s).10 The
analysis tool developed by several professors that uses several ratios to determine a
government’s fiscal condition and solvency, including a debt-service ratio).
8. For a discussion on financing capital projects in North Carolina, particularly the
marketing of capital debt, see DAVID M. LAWRENCE, FINANCING CAPITAL PROJECTS IN NORTH
CAROLINA §§ 500–509, at 119–50 (2d ed. 1994). For a broad, nationally focused overview of
each facet of the municipal-bond market, see NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS (6th ed. 2012), which discusses basics, issuers, the primary and secondary markets, the
investment market, credit analysis, interest rates, regulatory and disclosure requirements, and
more exotic instruments, such as rate swaps. Some believe that the municipal-bond market is
more easily shaken than other debt markets because municipal bonds are traditionally viewed as
a safe bet for investors (which is why, along with income-tax exemptions for earned interest,
local governments can offer lower rates than are available on the private bond market). See
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG 171–78 (2011) (providing a discussion of the local-government
bond market’s concern over defaults).
9. For example, in Israel, a large group of local governments underwent a severe financial
crisis; goods were not able to be financed and “[a]bout three quarters of the local governments
suffered from deficits—most of them had deficits of over 30% of their annual budgets.” Omer
Kimhi, Chronicle of a Local Crisis Foretold—Lessons from Israel, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679,
680 (2012) [hereinafter Kimhi, Chronicle]. “[M]arkets view a local crisis not as an isolated
event but rather as a warning sign for the condition of other localities. If a state allows the
default of one locality, other municipalities might suffer from similar problems and follow
suit.” Id. at 715 (footnote omitted). This ultimately leads to an increase in the cost “of credit
for all public issuers in the state, even for those issuers that have no direct connection with the
city’s default.” Id. (emphasis added). This pattern of increased cost of debt is borne out again
and again, as the Moody’s rating service pointed out when Atlantic City was put under an
emergency management team in January 2015—other local governments who were also
struggling were viewed as a greater credit risk going forward. See Andrew Coen, Moody’s:
Atlantic City EM Negative for New Jersey Locals, BOND BUYER (Jan. 27, 2015, 3:02 PM),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/moodys-atlantic-city-em-negative-for-newjersey-locals-1069903-1.html.
Our state debt system is also fairly unique compared to the rest of the world. For
example, only twenty-five of the world’s 193 countries are federalist systems; second, only two
other countries, Canada and Switzerland, do not have federally guaranteed state debt. Peterson
& Nadler, supra note 5, at 25253.
10. Orange County, California, is viewed as the typical example, and studies point to the
effects of Orange County’s default extending to other cities in California, to the state’s ability to
issue its own debt, and even to the municipal-bond market. See Dwight V. Denison, Did Bond
Fund Investors Anticipate the Financial Crisis of Orange County?, MUN. FIN. J., Fall 2000, at
24, 24–26; John M. Halstead et al., Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the
Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293, 313 (2004). Orange County
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extent of the impact caused by a default or other signals to the market is
debatable,11 but some effect undoubtedly exists.12
The interconnected nature of local governments in the local-government
debt market analogizes conveniently with the concepts of negative and
positive liberty.13 Local governments inevitably want the freedom to manage
debt as they choose and to take on more debt service if they find a buyer; local
governments want administrative flexibility that is “unobstructed by others.”14
However, if local-government debt management is left completely

engaged in “heavy borrowing and risky investments in its investment pool” before becoming
the largest municipal bankruptcy at that time. See Floyd Norris, Orange County’s Bankruptcy:
The Overview; Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond Market, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-county-s-bankruptcy-the-overvieworange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html. Whether this phenomenon still holds true is up for
debate, although a reclassification of general obligation bonds as “unsecured debt” would have
a significant effect on the rates that a lender might seek. See Karen Pierog & Tom Hals, Detroit
Bankruptcy Bond Fight a Watershed for Municipal Market, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2014, 9:17 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-bonds-idUSBREA1G0O
J20140217.
11. Bond Girl, Michael Lewis Falls for Meredith Whitney, While Getting the US Muni
Market Totally Wrong, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www.business
insider.com /response-to-michael-lewis-vanity-fair-piece-2011-9 (opining that an increase in
rates is not as dire among local governments in the United States as it may be with other
sovereigns because “state and local governments are not dependent on short-term market access
in the same way the US government and European sovereigns are,” and “[w]hen municipal rates
increased, state and local governments simply stopped issuing bonds”). Id. Indeed, only .06%
of general-purpose local governments have filed for bankruptcy since 2008. See Bankrupt
Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/
municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2014).
12. This effect on market stability is perhaps further affected by recent changes to the
potential yields for state and local securities as compared to federal securities. See Peterson &
Nadler, supra note 5, at 266. Peterson and Nadler discuss state bonds in the aftermath of
financial crisis as follows:
In the United States, investors were willing to accept lower interest rates on state
debt securities relative to US Treasuries due to their federal-tax-exempt status. After
the financial crisis, however, the yield on state bonds rose above that for comparable
federal securities, as any tax advantages were overwhelmed by perceived increased
risk. Rates of return on state bonds before the financial shock trailed those for
Treasury securities because federal taxes need not be paid on the returns from most
state and municipal bonds. But after the financial crisis, the spread between state and
federal bonds turned from negative to positive, as the relative risk from state
investments outweighed any tax advantages. Moreover, the yield spread between
state and federal bonds varied significantly from state to state, indicating that the
market perceived greater default risk in certain states.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
13. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
14. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 122.
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unobstructed, there is the potential for harm to the individual unit, its citizens,
and the broader market, if a government’s finances are mismanaged.15 As
former Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank said, “[n]o State, no State
legislators, no governor, can allow any one of its municipalities to default
because then every other municipality would pay through the nose. So that is
why this is not just some charity here; this is self-defense.”16
A policy solution exists to solve the problem of one government’s fiscal
instability affecting another government’s ability to borrow at a lower rate:
another actor can impose constraints on all local governments’ borrowing
abilities to maintain a stable market. However, to provide the positive liberty
of stable and inexpensive government debt, there is an implicit tradeoff—
some of a local government’s ability to borrow will be curtailed to provide
certainty to investors, issuers, and other parties in the market.17 This tension
plays out not only in intrastate borrowing habits, but also in our federalist
system.18
State governments fill this role through various forms of localgovernment debt oversight.19 One method of oversight involves an
15. See Kimhi, Chronicle, supra note 9, at 715 n.264, 716, 718 (discussing the “contagion
effects” of municipal default). Generally, default is perceived to cause wide-ranging harm to
municipal debt markets. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 400, at 92 (“Default causes longlasting harm to the unit involved and if widespread, may affect the market for securities of
creditworthy governments as well. Therefore states have sought ways to prevent local
governments from borrowing more than they can afford.”).
16. Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 25 (2008) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
17. See BERLIN, supra note 1, at 132 (noting in the individual’s context that while one may
be “[his] own master,” one is also a “slave to nature” or to external forces).
18. See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 5, at 26970. Peterson and Nadler define this sort
of tension and the temptation that local governments often face as follows:
When sovereignty is divided, lower-tier governments are tempted to run debts
that place themselves at grave risk of default in times of financial crisis. And central
governments, both to safeguard their international credit rating and to respond to
internal political pressures, cannot resist providing the assistance necessary to
safeguard bondholders and other creditors from loss. Central governments do not
offer a helping hand without at the same time asserting their authority, however. If
they rescue states and localities they will feel more than entitled to take preventative
measures designed to preclude future defaults. Irresponsibility at the state and local
level thus undermines the dual sovereignty essential for the survival of competitive
federalism. Celebrated in theory as an efficient government of Herculean
proportions, competitive federalism is but a ten-pound weakling in practice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Federal regulation of state and local financing is also robust. See generally 1 JAMES A.
CONIGLIO & M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 9:1–
9:23, at 9-2 to -64 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the role of federal securities laws within state- and
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authorization of extraordinary measures to handle crises when they emerge,
like in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,20 or the attempts to forestall bankruptcy in
Detroit, Michigan.21 Some states establish “early warning systems” to
monitor and alert the state to financially troubled local governments, which
often prompts state intervention before a crisis like those in Orange County,
Harrisburg, or Detroit can emerge.22 This auditing function requires local
local-government debt financing). Indeed, ongoing reporting requirements from the SEC have
changed in recent years. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES MARKET (2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport 073112.pdf
(noting several SEC recommendations regarding ongoing reporting requirements for municipal
securities). This Article focuses on the oversight mechanisms of local-government debt,
although the same arguments could be made for a federal oversight system that parallels a
system like North Carolina’s Local Government Commission.
The oversight role is also filled by states in their authorization of local-government
debt. Local governments do not have an inherent power to borrow; they receive that authority
from the state. 2 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra, § 12:4, at 12-19. States impose various
restraints on the categories of debt, as well as on debt limits. Id. at 12-19 to -20 (providing a list
of various state-enabling statutes).
20. See Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Sets Sale of Incinerator That Drove Insolvency,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-25/
harrisburg-to-sell-incinerator-that-drove-insolvency-next-week.html.
21. See Caitlin Devitt, Detroit Takeover Bodes Well for Investors, Muni Experts Say, BOND
BUYER (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_42/michigan-governorrick-snyder-state-takeover-of-detroit-good-for-investors-1049250-1.html (describing Michigan’s
takeover of Detroit).
Florida also has a “financial emergency board,” which “oversee[s] the activities of the
local government entity or the district school board,” and is triggered when a local government
either fails to pay debts, to transfer taxes withheld on the income of employees, to make payroll,
or to address operating deficits. See FLA. STAT. § 218.503(3)(g)(1) (2014). These receivership
structures also have their critics. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic
Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 577, 578 (2012) (arguing that the changes to receivership statutes enacted in Rhode
Island and Michigan do not address the underlying causes of fiscal stress in local governments,
and that the statutes “enact a punishing cancelation of local democracy”).
22. See Philip Kloha et al., Someone to Watch Over Me: State Monitoring of Local Fiscal
Conditions, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 236, 237 (2005) (“[S]tates have also developed more
proactive approaches in which they try to recognize problems and have mechanisms for dealing
with them before they balloon into fiscal crises.”). Ohio, for example, has such a monitoring
program, which also has an auditing function. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., STATE PROGRAMS FOR
MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL RECOVERY: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2011) [hereinafter PFM WHITE PAPER],
https://www.pfm.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Knowledge_Center/Whitepapers,_Articles,_
Commentary/Whitepapers/State%20Programs%20for%20Municipal%20Financial%20
Recovery.pdf. In Ohio:
[T]he State Auditor’s Office monitors local governments by providing them with
ratio indicators to benchmark financial performance and identify fiscal distress. The
State Auditor collects financial data on local governments through the state’s
Uniform Accounting Network (UAN). The UAN is a very low cost accounting
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governments to submit information to the state for review.23 Some states also
review certain types of debt instruments and require state approval before
issuing the debt.24 Some states have explicit control strategies for troubled
local governments, through which the state will take over the entirety of the
local government at varying degrees along the spectrum of fiscal emergency.25
Some states blend these approaches.26 Others impose constitutional or
statutory limitations on the type and amount of debt that local governments
may incur, although local governments sometimes design creative ways to
circumvent those limits.27 Some states choose a different course, like
Alabama did when its legislature chose not to intervene in Jefferson County,
thus allowing the county to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.28

software program provided to local governments. If a municipality decides to use the
program, it must agree to allow the State auditor to access and analyze its
information. More than 70 percent of Ohio’s local governments use the system. The
State Auditor uses the financial data to monitor their fiscal condition and may
recommend that a municipality enter one of . . . three programs, based on the severity
of financial distress.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. See, e.g., Online Audit Reports, MICH. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.michigan.gov/
treasury/ 0,1607,7-121-1751_31038---,00.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing financial
audits in an online repository).
24. For example, Connecticut does not allow for tax increment financing (TIF) bonds that
are backed by sales taxes unless the TIF bonds are approved by a joint committee of the
Connecticut General Assembly. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-285(f)(6) (2013) (including
incremental sales, hotel, cabaret, dues, and admissions taxes for use in a TIF district).
Connecticut also requires approval by its State Bond Commission before any type of TIF debt is
issued. See id. § 32-285(g)(2).
25. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 3–4 (discussing Massachusetts’s takeover of
the cities of Chelsea and Springfield, and its replacement of provisions regarding labor contract
negotiation).
26. See id. at 5–8 (discussing several states with multifaceted debt-approval mechanisms).
27. See Note, State Administrative Supervision of Local Government Debt: The North
Carolina Model, 1972 DUKE L.J. 487, 48788; see also 1 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19,
§§ 11:1–11:6, at 11-3 to -20 (describing the historical basis for constitutional debt limits and
current trends in debt limits in various states).
28. Bond Girl, The Incredible Story of the Jefferson County BankruptcyOne of the
Greatest Financial Ripoffs of All Time, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2011, 8:33 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/the-incredible-story-of-the-jefferson-county-bankruptcy-one-of-thegreatest-financial-ripoffs-of-all-time-2011-10 (“Unlike Harrisburg, where the state of
Pennsylvania moved swiftly to intervene in the city’s financial situation, the state of Alabama
has resisted providing any assistance to Jefferson County over the years.”). This has also had a
detrimental effect on borrowing for other Alabama local governments. See Sarah Frier,
Jefferson County Agony Means Higher Borrowing Costs for Alabama Taxpayers, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 22, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2011-08-22/jefferson-countyagony-means-higher-borrowing-costs-for-alabama-taxpayers.html.
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One state’s structure is unique among the various types of state-oversight
mechanisms, and it is also the debt structure that arguably exerts the most
control over local governments’ autonomy regarding their debt-financing
decisions. That structure is North Carolina’s Local Government Commission
(LGC).29
The LGC has its roots in remedying Depression-era defaults on localgovernment bonds, which were exceedingly high in North Carolina, even for
an era when defaults were occurring nationwide.30 What makes the LGC
unique is not only its blended approach to regulating debt financing, but also
the extent and reach of its various tools for regulating local-government
debt.31
This Article makes two principal arguments. First, it argues that the
LGC’s demonstrated record of ensuring fiscal stability is proof positive that a
regulatory body like the LGC can help local governments to avoid fiscal
crises, and may help to quell the recent uptick in Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings
going forward.32 While states often employ several individual oversight

29. See infra notes 198–240 and accompanying text (providing a general background of
North Carolina’s LGC); see also Stephen C. Fehr, North Carolina Agency is Local Government
Lifeline, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2012/06/06/north-carolina-agency-is-local-government-lifeline.
30. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 400, at 92 (“In 1933, for example, with the Great
Depression at its worst, 62 North Carolina counties, 152 cities and towns, and some 200 special
districts were in default on the principal or the interest or both, of outstanding obligations.”).
31. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 4. One report described the LGC’s approach
as follows:
If needed, the Commission can negotiate with creditors to work out a plan for the
municipality to repay its debts. In addition, if a municipality cannot meet its debt
obligations, the Commission may order the local government to raise taxes or other
revenues in adequate amounts to make the necessary debt service payments. At this
stage, the Commission may review and approve a municipality’s annual budget, and
the State Treasurer will benchmark the municipality’s finances to set its future
budgetary goals.
Id.
32. For a counterargument that local governments should wield “fiscal home rule,” see Joni
Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1997, at 54, 54, in which the
author argues that constitutional restrictions and state oversight have limited “local
government’s natural creativity and responsiveness.” Id.; see also Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four
CitiesModels of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
881, 887 (2012) [hereinafter Kimhi, Tale]. Kimhi states:
Perhaps the best example of such proactive state involvement can be found in
North Carolina. Pursuant to a general statute, North Carolina created a special state
agency to supervise local government finances: the Local Government Commission
(LGC). The commission monitors local governments and ensures their financial
stability. When certain indicators are met, the commission creates a special board to
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mechanisms and constitutional amendments,33 and although other factors may
step in to prevent fiscal disasters,34 North Carolina involves its state regulatory
agency with local governments at each step in the debt-issuing process to
ensure a proactive approach. In addition, the LGC retains the ability (through
an ongoing, rather than emergency authorization) to compel a municipality to
pay its debt service.35 This approach provides a degree of certainty to all
parties in the market, keeping borrowing rates low and increasing access to
credit markets for all of North Carolina’s local governments.36
Second, this Article contends that the mission of the LGC is unique and
should remain limited to ensuring that local governments maintain their fiscal
health. Examples of functions that are not suited for the LGC include the
supervision of (1) economic-development incentives, (2) pension funds, and
(3) school finance. Specifically, these functions should not be administered
by the LGC because they involve policy judgments, because an investment
function is not well matched to the core mission of the LGC, or because the
method of financing the activity makes it impossible for the LGC to exercise

intervene in the financial affairs of the distressed municipality and help it rehabilitate
its fiscal stability.
Id. Kimhi’s article also acknowledges the exceedingly difficult set of circumstances facing
local governments today, pointing to the importance of improving outcomes for local
governments. Id. at 881. Kimhi further states:
American cities are facing the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Many cities have difficulties financing their expenses, and substantial deficits in local
budgets are prevalent. 2011 was the fifth consecutive year in which local
governments experienced a decline in revenues, and according to the National
League of Cities, 57% of city financial officers report that their cities [are] less able
to meet their fiscal needs compared to the previous year. Property tax receipts are
down, and localities face massive pension and infrastructure obligations.
Id. at 882 (footnotes omitted). See also Bankrupt Cities, supra note 11 (showing a map of
municipal bankruptcy filings in the United States since 2000). There have been thirty-eight
filings under Chapter 9, although the filings were traditional units of government (three of those
were dismissed). Id. The other filings were nontraditional units of government, such as
water/sewer authorities. Id.
33. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. In Indiana, the state constitution imposes a limit on
the amount of debt that may be taken out by a local unit. Indiana does not allow the amount of
debt to be more than 2% of the total assessed value of a unit. Id.
34. For example, New York usually passes special legislation when a local government is
in distress, and then the state grants unique powers to a borrowing authority to alleviate the
problem, as well as to an oversight board to help guide the local government out of its dire
straits. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-36, -181 (2013) (providing the LGC with the authority to
increase taxes and to remove officers who do not comply with the LGC’s directive, both for
local governments and for water/sewer authorities).
36. See generally Fehr, supra note 29.
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sufficient control needed to bring the unit back to fiscal health.37 This Article
makes one final point about recent changes to the LGC’s issuing of guidelines
and its method of adoption—namely that if a guideline is issued as a strict
rule, the guideline should be encapsulated in the state’s administrative code or
codified by statute.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys various states’ oversight
mechanisms of local-government finance to demonstrate the different types
and forms of state supervision, setting up an argument for the cohesive
approach of the LGC. Part II explores the history of the LGC that led to its
creation in 1931, as well as the subsequent changes that resulted in today’s
LGC structure. Part III describes the current powers of the LGC, including
the types of debt that require approval. Part IV considers other expansions to
LGC authority concerning water/sewer districts, private financing for localgovernment infrastructure, economic-development projects, pension-fund
oversight, and supervision of school districts. Additionally, Part IV critiques
the LGC’s recent trend of adopting “guidelines” without adopting regulations
through the formal rulemaking process.
I.

A SURVEY OF OTHER STATES’ REGULATION OF LOCAL-GOVERNMENT
FINANCE

This Part includes brief summaries of various states’ approaches to localgovernment debt oversight to highlight three common approaches that states
take to oversee local-government debt.38 This consideration of various state
37. This argument relates to school finance in North Carolina. Specifically, in North
Carolina, school districts are not allowed to levy their own taxes, which unduly limits the
LGC’s ability to take corrective action to bring a unit back to fiscal health. See generally Lisa
Lukasik, Deconstructing a Decade of Charter School Funding Litigation: An Argument for
Reform, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1885, 1896 (2012). Lukasik explained:
Unlike state funding, local funds do not travel directly to the receiving charter
school from their source, typically a board of county commissioners. Instead, local
funding for all public schoolscharter schools and traditional public schoolsis
provided to the local board of education. Then, the charter school statute requires the
local board of education to “transfer to the charter school an amount equal to the per
pupil local current expense appropriation to the local school administrative unit for
the fiscal year.”
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29H(b) (amended 2013)); see also Margaret Rose
Westbrook, Comment, School Finance Litigation Comes to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV.
2123 (1995) (describing the effect of school-finance litigation in North Carolina).
38. Oversight and intervention are not the only strategies that can be used to prevent or
mitigate the damages of municipal fiscal insolvency. See generally Omer Kimhi, Reviving
Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 636 (2008)
[hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving Cities] (discussing three types of approaches to solving municipal
fiscal crises: creditors’ remedies, the Bankruptcy Code, and state financial-oversight boards).
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approaches lays the table for Part III, showing how the LGC’s authority
compares with these various state-oversight mechanisms. The first Section
describes the methods by which statewide entities approve local-government
debt. The second Section describes various states’ use of emergency-takeover
authority during fiscal crises. The third Section discusses how other states
oversee local-government debt through auditing and monitoring functions.
A.

Debt Approval39
1.

Louisiana

Like North Carolina, Louisiana experienced a large number of municipal
defaults in the 1930s.40 This shared history likely pushed Louisiana to fashion
a similar state-oversight authority in its state-approval agency, the Louisiana
State Bond Commission (LSBC), which is part of the state’s Department of
the Treasury.41 The LSBC was created in 1968 “to centralize and administer
the incurring of state debt,” and was later expanded to include local units of
government.42 These requirements are written into state statutes, but the
LSBC’s approval requirement was written into the state constitution as well.43
The LSBC also receives applications from local governments and other
political subdivisions for the ability to levy taxes.44
However, even with the LSBC as a state-oversight approval mechanism,
Louisiana has not avoided all local financial difficulties. For example, in
1999, the Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District became the first—
and so far, the only—Louisiana municipality to file for Chapter 9
bankruptcy.45 In response to the filing, the Louisiana legislature required
This Article accepts Kimhi’s argument that the state financial-oversight board is the preferable
approach, and then considers the various types against the LGC’s structure. Id.
39. There are other meanings that could be given to the term “approval.” For example, one
treatise discusses approval by the attorney general of some states, as well as other forms of
judicial validation that can be required for bonds. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL
DEBT FINANCE LAW §§ 2.7.1–.2, at 9296 (2d ed. 2013).
40. See Marc D. Joffe, Drivers of Municipal Bond Defaults During the Great Depression
1617, 21 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, San Francisco State University), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189889.
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:769, 36:802, 39:871 (2014).
42. State Bond Commission, LA. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.louisiana.gov/
Home%20Pages/BondCommission.aspx?@Filter=BC2012 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
43. LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. I, § 8, para. B (“No bonds or other obligations shall be issued or
sold by the state, directly or through any state board, agency, or commission, or by any political
subdivision of the state, unless prior written approval of the bond commission is obtained.”).
44. See State Bond Commission, supra note 42.
45. See Voluntary Petition, In re Lower Cameron Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., No. 99-21290
(Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 18, 1999); see also Lauren M. Wolfe, Comment, The Next Financial
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municipalities to receive approval from the LSBC before filing for
bankruptcy.46 Further, after Hurricane Katrina, the chair of the LSBC
provided assurance to ratings agencies and bond insurers that the state
treasurer would “not vote to allow any municipality in the state to enter into
bankruptcy.”47
While Louisiana’s approach is similar to the LGC’s,48 a key difference
between the LGC and the LSBC is that the auditing functions of the LSBC are
provided by a separate agency, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor,49 which
supports the LSBC, but is not housed in the same organizational structure.
Further, the LSBC does not have the ability to dictate fiscal policy to insolvent
governments; instead, the LSBC may attempt to prevent bankruptcies by
insisting that a local government not file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.50 This
approach forces the local government’s hand to raise additional revenues or
restructure its financial affairs. However, an approach that provides direct
state assistance might relieve some of the political pressures that the local
governments face, and could also bring in additional expertise that might
otherwise be lacking.
2.

Nevada

The State of Nevada requires all of its counties to establish a “debt
management commission.”51 The Nevada Department of Taxation offers
assistance to counties with populations of less than 47,500 to carry out the
duties of the commission, otherwise leaving the larger counties to provide
staffing and support to their respective debt-management commissions.52 The
state requires debt-management plans and financial statements to be sent to
the State Department of Taxation,53 and that notice is provided to relevant
local governments that would be affected by a debt concern and by subsequent
Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 n.6 (2012)
(citing Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ex-CEO Pleads Guilty to Medicare Fraud: La. Hospital Exec
Faces Five Years in Prison for Bilking Medicare out of $1.4 Million, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June
25, 2001, at 15; Mary Chris Jaklevic, Bankrupt But Open: La. Hospital That Owes HCFA
Millions Wins Reprieve, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 16, 2000, at 50).
46. See Wolfe, supra note 45, at 556.
47. Id. at 575 (quoting BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF LA., MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (2006), http://www.bgr.org/files/reports/
MunicipalBankruptcy4-5-06.pdf).
48. See infra notes 28593 and accompanying text.
49. See Advisory Services, LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, http://www.lla.state.la.us/localgovernment
/advisoryservices/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
50. Wolfe, supra note 45, at 57273.
51. NEV. REV. STAT. § 350.0115 (2011).
52. Id. § 350.0125.
53. Id. § 350.013.
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property tax increases.54 However, it seems duplicative to give a county,
rather than the state, the ability to approve its own debt through a debtmanagement commission.55 Given the makeup of the commissions, which
consist mostly of elected officials, the debt-management commission seems
more like a traditional elected board56 than an oversight mechanism by another
level of government.57
3.

New Jersey

The State of New Jersey employs a robust observation and approval
mechanism,58 but also shows the complicated interplay between “unfunded
mandates” from state to local governments.59 Like North Carolina,60 New
Jersey experienced many local-government defaults in the 1930s.61 Also like
North Carolina, New Jersey requires local governments to submit their
financial statements to the state office to ensure that the budget is balanced,62
and that it complies with statutory debt limits.63 Moreover, the state is
54. Id. § 350.0135. Provisions regarding notice requirements from local governments to
state agencies are also fairly common. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 10-109 (2001); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 66.045 (West 2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 108.240 (2000).
55. NEV. REV. STAT. § 350.014 (“[T]he proposed incurrence or levy must receive the
favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the commission of each county in which the
municipality is situated.”).
56. Id. § 350.0115.
57. For example, the Clark County Debt Management Commission is composed of three
county commissioners, six members of municipal governing boards, and two citizens. See
Clark County Regional Debt Management Commission, CLARKCOUNTYNV.GOV, http://www.
clarkcountynv.gov/depts/finance/Pages/RegionalDebtManagementCommission.aspx (last visited
Nov. 20, 2014). This is not necessarily problematic, but it seems to be a duplication of other
governing boards—with the exception of the two members of the public. Having an
intergovernmental board, however, has the potential benefits of cooperation and coordination of
debt across several localities.
58. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, NEW JERSEY REPORT 46–47 (2012), http://
www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/2012-10-22-New-Jersey-Report-Final.
pdf.
59. Id. at 46. The idea that some of these mandates are pushed down from the state to the
local governments is a valid cause for questioning the logic of allowing a state to control the
fiscal affairs of a local government. In some ways, the ability of a local government to have
complete control over its own debt financing is couched in the concept of home rule. See
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 39, § 2.2.2, at 6467.
60. See infra notes 198–240 and accompanying text.
61. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 58, at 46.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 47 (noting debt limits of “3.5 percent of three year equalized valuation for
municipalities; 2 percent for counties; and 4 percent for school districts”). To exceed these
statutory limits, a government must receive permission from the state’s Local Finance Board.
Id.
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required to maintain a “watch list” for localities that have not complied with
state filing requirements, or those that receive state aid as a “distressed”
municipality.64 If a locality is placed on this “watch list,” the local
government is required to submit its budget each year for approval by the
state.65
Through its Local Finance Board, New Jersey may also assume control
of a local government’s financial affairs.66 In recent years, the state has
assumed control of four local units’ finances: Atlantic City, Irvington, Union
City, and Asbury Park.67 Other oversight mechanisms include the Transitional
Aid Program, which requires localities with structural issues to submit to state
oversight in return for aid, as well as statutory debt thresholds, depending on
the type of local government issuing the debt.68 Specifically, in the distressedcommunities program, the director of the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs declares that the local government is in significant
financial distress, and the municipality enters into a “rehabilitation term,”
under which a chief operating officer (appointed by the governor) assumes the
powers of the local government.69
New Jersey and North Carolina share several similarities, but a key
difference is that for all of New Jersey’s robust mechanisms, there is no
requirement for debt approval by the state like the one found in North
Carolina. The Transitional Aid Program requires the municipality to agree “to
pursue structural budget reforms and adhere to state oversight requirements,”
but it is voluntary and more of a quid pro quo—it asks local governments to
cede some of their autonomy in return for state aid.70 With the LGC approach,
approval of debt applies across the board to healthy and financially distressed
governments. While this may be an unnecessary procedural step for
governments that are fiscally responsible, this step helps ensure that
governments do not need to voluntarily submit to a program like New Jersey’s
Transitional Aid Program, as the ongoing requirement for all debt to be
approved helps keep local governments out of the fiscal straits that would
necessitate entering the Transitional Aid Program.71
64. Id. at 46.
65. Id.
66. Id. These local-government units are no longer under the state’s control. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 47.
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BBB-9(f) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).
70. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 58, at 47.
71. This Transitional Aid Program also has the issue of being reactive in that local
governments are submitting to oversight after they have reached a point of fiscal distress.
Atlantic City, for example, entered the program, but now faces even more challenges as its
revenues from casinos decreased and its infrastructure costs increased after Hurricane Sandy.
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New York

New York has a wide-ranging, blended approach to oversight of its local
governments’ financial affairs,72 but there are significant differences between
New York’s approach and North Carolina’s model. The primary difference is
that New York’s approval approach is reactive—the state enacts legislation
granting the state approval authority to address crises as they occur.73 In these
individual circumstances, the authorities that are created to oversee the local
government are often given “power to approve or disapprove budgets and
financial plans, issue debt, and impose a wage and hiring freeze.”74 New York
also requires approval from its local finance boards before issuing debt,75
similar to Nevada’s requirement of a local board’s approval.
Within New York’s regulatory approach is a monitoring system for fiscal
stress.76 Once a unit is evaluated, the unit is assigned a grade based on several
ratios relating to financial indicators, as well as environmental indicators (such
as property values, population, age, and other metrics).77 After making this
assessment, the state comptroller will offer reviews of a unit’s budget,
technical assistance, financial planning over several years, training, and other
resources to help the unit gain competencies in administering its local
budgets.78
This system is fairly comprehensive, but it lacks the permanence of a
compulsory takeover provision; instead, it enacts legislation in specific
instances where default seems likely. That said, there are several layers of
oversight within the system, and it appears to be a well-run system of
monitoring and providing assistance to financially distressed local
governments.

See Marc Joffe, Atlantic City Declines: Will It End in a Municipal Bond Default?, BITVORE
(July 14, 2014), http://bitvore.com/2014/07/atlantic-city-declines-will-it-end-in-a-municipalbond-default/. Perhaps earlier intervention would have mitigated the issues that Atlantic City
now faces by limiting the amount of debt incurred by the city.
72. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5. Note also that Connecticut has a similar
structure in which it appoints a supervisory board on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 5–6.
73. Id. at 5. This is also the case in Massachusetts. See infra notes 91–105 and
accompanying text.
74. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5.
75. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 33.00 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2014).
76. See generally DIV. OF LOCAL GOV’T & SCH. ACCOUNTABILITY, OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE
COMPTROLLER, FISCAL STRESS MONITORING SYSTEM 1, 6–7 (2014), https://osc.state.ny.us/
localgov/pubs/fiscalmonitoring/pdf/fiscalstressmonitoring.pdf (discussing the methodology
used by the state comptroller to determine whether a local school district or a local government
is in fiscal distress).
77. Id. at 3–8.
78. Id. at 12.
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Other States

Some states simply require approval for certain types of debt. For
example, Connecticut employs statewide approval for tax increment financing
by its state bond commission.79 Other states have statutory approval
requirements as a litmus test for local governments to pass—both
quantitatively and qualitatively.80 There are, however, limitations to using
such statutory approvals, which has led a number of states to create other
types of incentives to use state-run “bond banks” to place debt.81
Allowing a local government to use a state-run debt-placement group is
more of a voluntary approach; there is no explicit requirement that debt must
be approved by a state agency, but the agency can coerce the local government
with lower rates should it submit to the state bank’s restrictions. Other states,
like California, have had less formal oversight or power to control financially
distressed local governments, arguably leading to a greater number of defaults
and bankruptcies.82
B.

State Takeover Provisions for Emergencies83
1.

Florida

Generally, state takeover statutes responding to fiscal crises can be
divided into two categories: (1) ad hoc responses to specific local-government
crises, or (2) generally applicable statutes that are used to assist financially
distressed local governments.84 Florida’s statute falls into the latter category,
as Florida creates a generally applicable system that subjects a local
government to review and oversight by the governor.85 The state auditor uses

79. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-285(g)(2) (2013).
80. See Note, supra note 27, at 492–93 (describing the process of marketing localgovernment debt).
81. Id. at 494–95.
82. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 10.
83. A fantastic discussion of the many facets of emergency takeovers of troubled local
governments can be found in Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 883 (“Indeed, most local fiscal
crises since the 1970s, like the ones in New York, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Yonkers, Miami,
Princeville, Chelsea, and Pittsburg, were dealt with through the creation of state boards, rather
than through the help of bankruptcy procedures.”).
84. See id. at 886–87. The generally applicable financial-emergency statutes contain
statutorily defined language that triggers takeover provisions. See Kloha, supra note 22, at
242–44 (discussing various factors considered by the states that employ the generally applicable
emergency-takeover structures).
85. FLA. STAT. § 218.503 (2014). The oversight and review is triggered if one of four
conditions is met:
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several different metrics to determine whether a local-government unit is in
fiscal distress,86 and once the conditions for a financial emergency are met, the
local government and the state work together to determine whether state
assistance is needed to rectify the fiscal issues.87
Getting to the current structure involved previous financial crises in
prominent Florida cities, particularly Miami. In the 1990s, Miami
experienced a budget deficit of $68 million (20% of the city’s total budget).88
However, at that time, rather than having the emergency-takeover powers, the
state was merely acting as an advisory board and was openly mocked by
Miami politicians.89 When the emergency board started to take a firmer stance
with the city, the process sped up, and Miami’s bonds became investment
grade again.90 Today, Florida’s system has many of the necessary features to
address fiscal crises, but its troubled past also shows the delicate politics
involved in a state’s regulation of local-government finances.

(a) Failure within the same fiscal year in which due to pay short-term loans or failure
to make bond debt service or other long-term debt payments when due, as a result of
a lack of funds.
(b) Failure to pay uncontested claims from creditors within 90 days after the claim is
presented, as a result of a lack of funds.
(c) Failure to transfer at the appropriate time, due to lack of funds:
1. Taxes withheld on the income of employees; or
2. Employer and employee contributions for:
a. Federal social security; or
b. Any pension, retirement, or benefit plan of an employee.
(d) Failure for one pay period to pay, due to lack of funds:
1. Wages and salaries owed to employees; or
2. Retirement benefits owed to former employees.
Id. (formatting altered).
86. Financial Condition Assessment Procedures, ST. FLA. AUDITOR GEN., http://www.
myflorida.com/audgen/pages/fca_procedures.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (including
differing indicia of financial health, such as revenues divided by population).
87. FLA. STAT. § 218.503.
88. See Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 894.
89. Id. at 894–95.
90. Id. at 896. As Kimhi noted:
Without coercion from the state, it is likely that the city would have continued
with its dubious financial practices. If we know that such coercion is needed,
however, it makes more sense to give the board adequate powers to begin with. It is
possible that had the Miami board been given stronger powers from the start, the two
years of economic distress after the board’s creation would have been saved, and the
city’s rehabilitation process would have been faster and easier.
Id.
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Massachusetts

The State of Massachusetts also takes over troubled municipalities, but
does so on more of an ad hoc basis. The Massachusetts model is sometimes
called the “state receivership” or “takeover” model, in which a state “appoints
a receiver for the locality and the receiver manages the locality instead of its
elected officials.”91 Within this model, “[t]he receiver has complete control
over local affairs, while the elected local officials are usually removed from
office.”92 An example of this is the receivership that the City of Chelsea was
placed under in the early 1990s due to a decrease in collected revenues and a
lack of decrease in expenditures by the politically elected board of Chelsea.93
To rectify Chelsea’s problems, the state legislature passed an act placing
Chelsea in receivership, and the operations of the city were assumed by the
state.94 The state receiver was then able to use this broad grant of authority to
take drastic actions to repair the city’s finances, restoring Chelsea to fiscal
health in six months.95
Professor Omer Kimhi, one of the few legal scholars to write about
municipal insolvency oversight authorities, argues that this model has serious
drawbacks; namely that there are political-opposition problems and problems
of the state exerting its interests at the expense of a locality’s interests.96
Professor Kimhi’s analysis points to the importance of a local government’s
ability to determine its own course.97 However, the case of Chelsea shows
why this value should be subrogated for a time to ensure that surrounding
municipalities can exercise self-determination of their own affairs, and to
protect the interests of taxpayers and bondholders.
To use Professor Kimhi’s example, Chelsea experienced an exodus of
high-wage families and an influx of low-income residents in the 1970s.98
During this time, Chelsea remained beholden to political groups that exerted
influence over the politically elected governing board.99 Indeed, the political
influence was so strong that the board chose “to lead the city into insolvency
91. Id. at 897.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 897–98.
94. Id. at 898–99; see also Act of Sept. 12, 1991, ch. 200, 1991 Mass. Acts 679
(establishing a receivership for the City of Chelsea).
95. See Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 899.
96. Id. at 900–01.
97. Cf. id. at 906 (“State intervention in fiscal crises is needed because states are in a better
position than local governments to address both the socioeconomic and the political causes of
the crisis. The state is able to take actions that local officials are unable to take and its
involvement provides the political backup to initiate a rehabilitation process.”).
98. Id. at 897.
99. Id. at 898.
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rather than resist the unions’ demands by initiating reforms.”100 This scenario
demonstrates precisely why state supervision of a locality is acutely necessary.
The city may often remain flailing in the face of its financial burdens:
encumbered by local politics, unable to cut expenses, and unwilling to raise
taxes to meet its debt and operating burdens until it is too late. Having a state
agency step in to act as a neutral party that can restore balance to a locality’s
books and to take the political pressure off of the local governing body seems
to alleviate many of these structural problems that normally prohibit the local
governing boards from taking the necessary actions to correct their budgetary
imbalances.
This is not to say that there are no critiques of Massachusetts’s system.
Kimhi’s point is taken that the appointed receiver in Massachusetts was a
political operative,101 but a state could easily use an administrative
appointment or form a bipartisan committee to ensure that a competent
manager is put in place. A second criticism is that Massachusetts’s system
requires the legislature to take action by passing legislation to create a
receivership in each individual circumstance.102 Chelsea is not the only
instance where a receivership has been appointed in Massachusetts; more
recently, Springfield, a city with a population above 150,000, was placed
under receivership.103 Again, the receivership model worked well, changing a
$41 million deficit in fiscal year 2005 to a $40 million fund balance in fiscal
year 2009.104 Still, using the receivership model was an ad hoc decision that
required legislative action. Without protocols and metrics that automatically
place a town in receivership, the debt market is left with the uncertainty of
whether Massachusetts will place another town under receivership in the
future, and if so, under what circumstances.105

100. Id. (citing Ed Cyr, Thoughts on the Chelsea Receivership, GOV’T FIN. REV., Aug. 1993,
at 23).
101. See Chelsea City Managers After Receivership, OLGP.NET, https://web.archive.org/
web/20121019170449/http://olgp.net/chs/mayors/manager/manager.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2014) (describing James Carlin’s background, including the fact that he was previously
appointed by Governor Edward King to serve as the Commissioner of Commerce before he was
appointed as Chelsea’s receiver in 1991).
102. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 3–4.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id.
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Indiana

One of Indiana’s provisions to address fiscal emergencies relates to
constitutional restrictions concerning property tax receipts.106 Indiana
operates under the Distressed Unit Appeals Board (DUAB),107 which receives
requests from local governments that expect to have reductions in received
property taxes of 5% or more resulting from restrictions that were put in place
in 2008.108 However, Indiana also passed constitutional amendments to
restrict property taxes to a certain percentage,109 meaning that distressed units
will have to seek other means of collecting funds to meet revenue gaps.110
In the wake of these constitutional amendments, Indiana broadened the
powers of the DUAB, specifically requiring that an emergency manager be
appointed if a local government is found to be a “distressed political
subdivision.”111 The emergency manager is allowed to exercise the authority
and responsibility of the local government’s governing board, review the
budget, review the salaries of the local-government employees, conduct an
audit, create a financial plan for the unit, renegotiate labor contracts, and many
other powers to correct the fiscal issues that might occur within a unit.112 In
other words, Indiana allows the state’s emergency managers to exercise broad
powers in times of financial crisis.
Perhaps most interesting about this model is that appointment of an
emergency manager is mandatory after the DUAB determines that a political
subdivision is a distressed entity.113 The statute that defines “distressed
entity” also has several triggering events laid down for the appointment of the
emergency manager—for example, if the subdivision has a deficit of 8% of its
revenues (i.e., a negative fund balance of 8%).114 This is perhaps clearer than
the LGC’s guidelines, which are not set forth by statute, but instead are

106. 1 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19, § 11:4, at 11-14 to -17 (discussing diverse
states’ constitutional limits on property taxes as a percentage of total value).
107. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-20.3-4 (2010).
108. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 7.
109. Id.
110. For a discussion of alternative forms of collecting revenues beyond traditional property
tax, see generally Reynolds, supra note 6, in which the author reviews special assessments and
assorted forms of revenue-producing mechanisms used by local governments in instances where
property tax caps are set by a state’s constitution.
111. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-20.3-7.5.
112. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-8.5.
113. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-7.5.
114. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-6.5.
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determined by the agency in a somewhat informal method.115 Placing these
items in statutes may reduce flexibility and administrative discretion, but may
also be welcomed by the local governments as a clear expectation of what
precisely would lead to their loss of fiscal autonomy to state oversight.
Indiana’s approach also has advantages to the methods employed by
Massachusetts in that there is an existing standing committee ready to handle
financial concerns, and the state does not have to wait on specific legislative
actions every time there is a financial crisis.
The approach is not as proactive as the LGC’s method because it does
not require a certain level of positive fund balance before debt is issued (as the
LGC does); it provides definitions of a unit that has entered a situation of
fiscal distress rather than preventing the unit from incurring debts that will
lead to that scenario.116 The Indiana Department of Local Government
Finance does review the indebtedness of school districts to ensure that their
appropriations are sufficient to service their incurred debt.117 The Department
of Local Government Finance also approves and sets property tax rates for all
political subdivisions within the state.118 This power to set property rates even
when a unit is not in fiscal distress adds a state-oversight component of localgovernment finance not seen in many other states, but further requirements on
the financial conditions of units before they incur additional debts would
provide additional stability. There is also a robust staff of state employees
charged with ensuring compliance with budgetary creation and data analysis
of local governments in Indiana.119

115. See infra notes 241–96 and accompanying text. This is not to say that the LGC does
not have reasons for its fund-balance requirements or other policies, but rather that they are not
put into regulatory or statutory form.
116. There are some types of debt that are subject to the constitutional limitations, and some
that are not. See Erin Blasko, Officials: Local Government Debt Under Control, S. BEND TRIB.
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-08-03/news/29848831_1_debt-limitlocal-government-debt-borrowing-limit. For example, debt incurred by redevelopment agencies
or the parks department does not count toward the constitutional limit of 2%. Id.
117. IND. CODE § 20-48-1-11 (2010); see also id. § 20-46-7-14 (forbidding the Indiana
Department of Local Government Finance from approving bonds that fail to provide for
principal payments in some amount, and certain other financial arrangements).
118. Id. § 6-1.1-17-16; see also id. § 6-1.1-17-8.
119. See Department of Local Government Finance: About Us, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/
dlgf/2337.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
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Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania recently enacted significant modifications to its structure of
local-government debt oversight on October 31, 2014.120 Under the modified
version of Pennsylvania’s law, the previously existing four types of stateoversight programs designed to help local governments avoid and mitigate
fiscal problems remain: the Early Intervention Program,121 Act 47,122
intergovernmental authorities,123 and state receivership.124 The 2014
legislation adds some new wrinkles to the state’s ongoing oversight of its local
governments that are experiencing fiscal distress, including a fixed time limit
that a local government can remain in the Act 47 program, as well as new
procedures that allow for disincorporation of local governments that cannot
attain fiscal solvency.
The Early Intervention Program (EIP) is a proactive program designed
“to establish short-term and long-term financial and managerial objectives that
strengthen the fiscal capacity of Pennsylvania’s county and municipal
governments along with the integration of long term community and economic
development strategies that strengthen the local government’s tax base.”125
The EIP was formally codified in statute by the 2014 legislation.126
The EIP is similar to North Carolina’s LGC in that it helps to pair
Pennsylvania local-government units with advisors before a crisis occurs. A

120. See Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 2014, No. 199 (Oct. 31, 2014) (amending
scattered sections of 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.101–.501 (West 2014)), available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/CH/Public/ucons_pivot_pge.cfm?session=2014&se
ssion_ind=0&act_nbr=0199.&pl_nbr=0000.
121. See generally PA. DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV., EARLY INTERVENTION PROGRAM
GUIDELINES (2004), http://dev.pelcentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/early_intervention_
program_guidelines-04.pdf (discussing the program in detail, as well as the different financial
assessment steps). The EIP is now codified in statute. See PA. HOUSE COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, at 1 (2014), available at http://www.legis.
state.pa.us/WU01/LI/BI/FN/2013/0/HB1773P4312.pdf.
122. Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987, No. 47, 1987 Pa. Laws 246 (codified as
amended at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.101–.501).
123. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 8–9.
124. Id.
125. PA. DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV., supra note 121, at 1. The 2014 legislation adds seven
explicit objectives, including (1) providing assistance to municipalities in planning and
addressing their financial difficulties, (2) engaging in a management review, (3) strengthening
local governments’ capacities for financial planning, (4) implementing a multiyear revenue and
expenditure trend analysis, (5) promoting multiple jurisdiction regional planning, (6) supporting
a municipality’s adoption of best management and efficiency practices, and (7) furthering the
“integration of sound community and economic development strategies to encourage” economic
development and tax base growth. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.102-A.
126. See FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, supra note 121, at 1.
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difference between the EIP and the LGC is that the EIP’s assistance is not
automatically triggered—local governments must apply for assistance from
the state to hire independent consultants for creating solutions to the local
government’s fiscal problems.127 There is also no debt-approval component—
the EIP simply helps units with their planning and management rather than
requiring the steps be implemented.
The 2014 legislation also modified the EIP to include authorization for
the Governor’s Center for Local Government Services (GCLGS) to offer
grants up to $200,000 (with a required match) in the initial fiscal year to
implement the goals of the EIP.128 The grants provided by GCLGS are meant
to implement programs that serve the purposes of the EIP, such as
implementing financial forecasting modeling in a local government.129 The
2014 legislation also authorized the Pennsylvania Department of Community
and Economic Development (DCED) to recommend that municipalities enter
into the EIP, although it did not grant the DCED the authority to require entry
into the program.130
Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1987 known as Act 47 to provide for a
designation of certain cities as fiscally distressed.131 Act 47 includes a portion
relating to “municipal financial distress,” which lists criteria for determining
the financial stability of Pennsylvania local governments.132 If the criteria are
met, then the DCED appoints a coordinator (who is not a member of elective

127. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 8; see also 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.102A.
128. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.103-A, .104-A. The matching amount from the
local government is presumed to be a 50% match of the total amount provided by the GCLGS,
and can be in-kind, although officials from the GCLGS may reduce the required match to a
minimum of 10%. See id. § 11701.104-A(b).
129. See id. § 11701.104-A(c).
130. See id. § 11701.121(b).
131. Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987, No. 47, 1987 Pa. Laws 246; see also
Kate Giammarise, Sweeping Changes to Act 47 Proposed in Harrisburg, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/2014/08/31/Sweeping-changesto-Act-47-proposed-in-Harrisburg-Pennsylvania/stories/201408220165.
132. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.201. If any of the criteria are met, the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development may begin the planning process. Id.
Some of the criteria include, for example, the municipality maintains a deficit over a three-year
period, with a deficit of 1% or more in each of the previous fiscal years; the municipality’s
expenditures exceed its revenues for a period of three years or more; the municipality has
missed a payroll for thirty days; the municipality has accumulated and operated for each of two
successive years a deficit equal to 5% or more of its revenues; or the municipality has filed a
Chapter 9 municipal debt adjustment plan. Id. §§ 11701.201(1), (2), (4), (7), (10). The list
contains a total of eleven criteria.
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office)133 and undertakes a planning process to help the unit cure the fiscal
issues that it faces.134
The DCED’s plan may be accepted or rejected by the local unit, although
the local unit is required to make a separate plan that the DCED accepts if the
unit rejects the initial DCED plan.135 If no plan is adopted at all, then the state
may withhold funds from the local government.136 However, if a plan is
adopted, the adopting local government is given priority access to stateassistance grants over other municipalities in distress, waivers of some state
regulatory requirements, and access to new revenue streams, such as a localservices tax.137 Another incentive for local governments to adopt such a plan
is that the coordinator can set maximum thresholds for future collective
bargaining agreements, which would improve the local government’s
bargaining position with its labor unions and help the local government
control costs.138 The 2014 legislation also added a provision allowing the
secretary of DCED to request a declaration of financial emergency from the
governor if the distressed municipality adopts no plan.139
Unfortunately, these plans do not always work as expected. If a city is
insolvent or is projected to be insolvent within 180 days, is unable to provide
vital and necessary services, fails to adopt the coordinator’s plan, or does not
adopt an alternative plan accepted by the DCED, a state of fiscal emergency
can be declared by the governor.140 This leads to the establishment of a
receivership for the city,141 as well as the enactment of a “Recovery Plan.”142
Once a city is under receivership, the governor and the appointed receiver
have full control of the locality and may renegotiate contracts and confine
wages as needed (without dissolving labor agreements entirely).143
Adding to Pennsylvania’s complexity is that Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
were put under the oversight auspices of separate “Intergovernmental
Authorities,” which have limited authority over these cities.144 The

133. Id. §§ 11701.221, .224.
134. Id. § 11701.121.
135. Id. § 11701.246.
136. Id. §§ 11701.248, .251, .264.
137. Id. §§ 11701.281, .282.
138. Id. § 11701.252.
139. See id. § 11701.248.
140. Id. § 11701.602.
141. Id. § 11701.702.
142. Id. § 11701.703.
143. Id. § 11701.706; PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9.
144. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9. Note also the distinction made by the
legislation in its title: Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority Act for Cities of
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Philadelphia authority, the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation
Authority (PICA), comprises a five-member voting board (and two additional
nonvoting members); all voting members are political appointees.145 Initially,
the PICA board had the authority to issue bonds,146 but this authority has now
lapsed.147 The PICA board retains the authority to approve all five-year plans
until all of the debt issued under the current and prior board is repaid.148 The
Intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement (Pittsburgh’s agreement) has
similar requirements for the ICA in how it approves of Pittsburgh’s annual
budget and five-year plan. However, both the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Authority and the PICA may not “nullify a non-compliant labor
agreement.”149 The PICA system remains after the 2014 legislation.150
Pennsylvania’s system shows why an LGC-style organization would be
useful in this context. The EIP, which is analogous to the LGC’s oversight of
local government, appears to be a strong program of early detection.
However, the EIP was, and still is, voluntary. There are also additional ways
to mitigate the financial problems that a municipality faces through Act 47
provisions, but those methods only become available after the unit has already
reached a point of fiscal instability. Further, the subsidies provided by Act 47
sometimes lasted for decades, which seemed to create a dependency on its
features in some cases, rather than getting units back to fiscal solvency
quickly.151 In addition, authorities were established for the state’s two largest
cities, but each of those entities had its own problems associated with being
composed of appointed officials from the state legislature with relatively little
authority to do anything beyond approving the plans proposed by the local
government.152 In short, Pennsylvania’s system has several different state
oversight programs. Coordinating these services within one organization
the First Class. See Act of June 5, 1991, No. 6, 1991 Pa. Laws 9 (codified at 31A PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12720.101–.709).
145. See 31A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 12720.202 (noting that the two nonvoting ex officio
members are the Secretary of the Budget of the Commonwealth and the Director of Finance for
the City of Philadelphia).
146. Id. § 12720.301.
147. Id. § 12720.319 (“No bond shall be issued for the purpose of financing a capital project
or a deficit, other than a cash flow deficit, on a date later than December 31, 1994.”).
148. Id. §§ 12720.210, .319; PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9 (“PICA must continue
to approve annual five year plans until all of the debt is repaid.”).
149. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9 & 12 n.36 (discussing Act 11, which was passed
in 2004 to assist Pittsburgh with its financial hardships).
150. See FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, supra note 121, at 13 (excepting Philadelphia
from the amendments).
151. See Giammarise, supra note 131 (noting that Clairton, Pennsylvania, and other
Pennsylvania local governments have been under Act 47 designation for over twenty years).
152. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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would likely be more efficient and would lead to better information-sharing,
monitoring, and ultimately, more effective interventions during a fiscal crisis.
To wit, despite these various programs existing for more than a decade,
Pennsylvania’s unique approach enabled a near-default on $3.3 million in
bonds by Harrisburg in 2010.153 Harrisburg and other cities likely reached a
point of near-default for the simple fact that default was seen as an option.
The mayor of Harrisburg even admitted to defaulting on bonds to preserve
services,154 which shows that while these defaults may be a problem of
adequate resource-allocation, they are likely “the consequence of an absence
of political will.”155 While the mayor of Harrisburg made a valid point that a
bond payment may not be as important on a micro level as something like
police or fire services, on a macro level, the defaulting of a city may
negatively affect the ability of surrounding localities to provide the very types
of services that he wanted to preserve. Harrisburg’s issues continued, and in
2011, the city entered receivership after first attempting to enter into
bankruptcy without state approval.156
Pennsylvania’s story, like Harrisburg’s, has changed over the last two
years. In 2013, the “Harrisburg Strong Plan” was adopted.157 The plan
allowed for the sale of the incinerator that was at the heart of many of the
city’s financial troubles.158 Additionally, the Harrisburg Strong Plan allowed
Harrisburg to create new revenue streams from partnerships with the state and
with local economic development groups.159 Harrisburg has now exited

153. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 282 (2012).
154. Id. (“To disrupt [services] because we can’t make a bond payment would just be
unconscionable. And as a leader I couldn’t do it . . . .” (quoting Romy Varghese, Harrisburg
Surrender: Why Pennsylvania’s Capital Skipped Its Debt Payment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2010,
at C1 (statement of Harrisburg Mayor Linda Thompson))).
155. Id. at 283. There are people who argue for federal intervention as well. See id. at 308–
09.
156. Judah Bellin, Can Harrisburg Come Back?, CITY J. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.cityjournal.org/2014/eon1014jb.html.
157. See Emily Previti, State Officials File ‘Harrisburg Strong Plan’ for Resolving City’s
Debt, PATRIOT NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:33 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/
2013/08/harrisburg_debt_plan_filed.html (“The plan begins by detailing the sale of the
Harrisburg incinerator that’s become a monument to those destructive political and financial
habits for which the city is infamous.”); see also Walker v. City of Harrisburg, No. 569 M.D.
2011, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.pacourts.us/assets
/files/setting-651/file-3053.pdf?cb=8e8741 (confirming the Harrisburg Strong Plan).
158. See Walker, slip op. at 3.
159. See id. at 3–4; Previti, supra note 157.
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receivership, and some have observed that elements of the Harrisburg Strong
Plan have become part of the statewide Pennsylvania model of receivership.160
Other changes have occurred in Pennsylvania as well. One of the biggest
changes is that time limits are now placed on a local government’s enjoyment
of the Act 47 provisions.161 Now, municipalities that enter distressed status
under Act 47 will have a five-year limit to this status.162 If a municipality is
already in distressed status, the five-year period begins to run from the
effective date of the municipality’s most recent recovery plan or amendment
to its recovery plan.163 If the municipality’s current recovery plan is set to
expire within one year or less of the effective date of the 2014 amendments,
the municipality is granted a one-time automatic three-year extension.164
Lastly, the amendments to Act 47 have created a somewhat radical new
option: disincorporation of nonviable municipalities.165 This procedure
requires the secretary of DCED to determine whether a municipality is
viable.166 In making this determination, the secretary of DCED must find that
(1) the municipality cannot provide essential services to its residents; (2) the
municipality’s economy and tax base have collapsed, and all reasonable
efforts to restore the economic health of the community have failed; and (3)
the municipality cannot merge with a neighboring municipality or such a
merger would not solve the unit’s issues.167
After the secretary of DCED makes a finding of nonviability, one of two
processes may initiate a disincorporation: (1) the municipality’s governing
board may initiate a disincorporation proceeding itself within forty-five days
of the secretary’s finding, or (2) a petition of 51% of the electorate who voted
in the last gubernatorial election may be submitted to the court of common
pleas within sixty days after the municipality’s governing body’s forty-fiveday window, if the governing body does not initiate proceedings on its own.168
If neither the governing body of the municipality nor the majority petition are
160. See Pennsylvania Governor Corbett Announces Commonwealth Court Has Granted
Application to Vacate Receivership for the City of Harrisburg; Rescinds Fiscal Emergency, PA.
DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV. (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://www.newpa.com/newsroom/
governor-corbett-announces-commonwealth-court-has-granted-application-vacate-receivershipfor-city-h; see also William C. Rhodes et al., Act 47: Pennsylvania Says Enough Is Enough. Or
Is It?, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/
legalalerts/2014-10-31-act-47-pennsylvania-says-enough-is-enough-or-is-it.aspx.
161. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.254 (West 2014).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id. §§ 11701.431, .446.
166. See id. § 11701.431.1.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 11701.432.
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filed, or if a reviewing court finds that the municipality should not be
disincorporated, the secretary of DCED then determines whether the
municipality should continue under a recovery plan, whether the municipality
should be placed into receivership, whether the municipality’s distressed
status should be terminated, or whether the municipality should initiate a
bankruptcy proceeding.169
After the court of common pleas or the secretary of DCED determines
that disincorporation is appropriate, a service district administrator is
appointed by the secretary of DCED and given broad powers to change the
fiscal complexity of a municipality prior to final disincorporation of the
municipality.170 The administrator may sell or convey municipal assets; repay
debts, bonds, or other obligations; seek a writ of mandamus against the
municipality to carry out a disincorporation; approve, disapprove, and
negotiate contracts for services; identify essential services for residents; apply
for grants; establish fees; and hire professionals to aid in her duties.171
The administrator must put forth her essential-services plan within ninety
days of being appointed. This plan provides for necessary public services,
emergency management, payment of debt obligations, and establishes the
unincorporated service district that will replace the municipality.172 There is
an initial plan, a notice and comment period, and then a final plan, which also
has a notice period.173
Prior to disincorporation, the municipality must pass a budget that funds
the municipality’s obligations until the municipality is disincorporated.174 The
municipality must also provide for the transfer and administration of
municipal pension obligations to another private or public pension fund.175
Once the municipality is disincorporated, the terms of the essentialservices plan end, the terms of the elected officials end, municipal ordinances
are nullified, and the corporate powers of the municipality terminate.176 All
remaining property of the municipality becomes property of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, held in trust until such a time that the
unincorporated service district merges with another municipality or is

169. Id. § 11701.433.1.
170. Id. § 11701.434.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 11701.436.
173. Id. §§ 11701.437, .438.
174. Id. § 11701.435.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 11701.439. However, the zoning ordinances that were in existence within the
municipality are required to be adopted by the county where the municipal boundaries existed.
Id.
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reincorporated.177 The service district does not enjoy the powers of a
traditional municipality, such as the taxing authority or the power to establish
elected offices.178
The effect of the 2014 amendments is to provide Pennsylvania
municipalities with additional tools to help its financially distressed cities
emerge from fiscal distress, and to set a time limit on remaining within a
“fiscally distressed” status. Both of these measures are positive steps.
One possible further step remains for Pennsylvania, however:
Pennsylvania could allow for an administrative agency to oversee all publicdebt issuances and require approval of all public debt prior to issuance.179 By
monitoring and approving debt before a local government reaches the level of
voluntarily entering the EIP, the local government might avoid the
intervention altogether. While an early intervention is thankfully still, by its
definition, early in the process of a municipality experiencing fiscal stress,
keeping local governments out of a fiscal area that requires intervention is a
better outcome for all parties.
C.

State Auditing and Monitoring Functions

To discuss some of the potential front-end monitoring solutions, this
Section briefly considers the auditing procedures of Georgia, Michigan, and
Ohio.
1.

Georgia180

In Georgia, the Department of Community Affairs has the task of
conducting an annual review of local-government budgets and financial
177. Id. § 11701.441.
178. Id.
179. Pennsylvania already has constitutional provisions relating to debt limits. See PA.
CONST. art. IX, §§ 10, 12. There is no limit set on debt that is approved by the electorate. See
53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8021. Nonelectoral debt is subject to a “borrowing base”
calculation. See id. § 8022(a); see also Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf et al., State Fiscal Constraints
on Local Government Borrowing: Effects on Scale and Cost, in HANDBOOK OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FISCAL HEALTH 475, 479 (Helisse Levine et al. eds., 2013). Philadelphia is not
subject to the same debt limits as the rest of the state; instead, its debt limits are specifically set
forth in Pennsylvania’s state constitution. See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
180. Interestingly, Georgia does not allow a municipality to file for bankruptcy; instead, the
unit of government is dissolved, and all of its assets are transferred to the county where it is
located. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-68-1 (2012). Georgia is one of only two states that prohibit
municipal bankruptcy in its entirety. The other state, Iowa, does have a filing exception for
“insolvency caused by debt involuntarily incurred not covered by insurance proceeds.” JAMES
E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT D-2 (2012)
(citing IA. CODE ANN. § 76.16A), available at http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_
Primer.pdf.
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statements.181 Units that do not comply with generally accepted accounting
principles are required to undergo an audit, losing their ability to receive state
grant funds if they do not comply with the accounting requirement.182
The Department of Community Affairs has other functions as well. For
example, the department administers several federal grants and assists with
urban- and rural-development planning.183 Additionally, the department is
tasked with overseeing local-government authorities (such as a business
improvement district or a water/sewer authority as opposed to the actual local
governments), which are required to register with the Department of
Community Affairs.184
On balance, Georgia’s decision to withhold state funds is a different
strategy for ensuring local compliance. Local governments depend greatly on
state aid and resources—to deprive them of these financial lifelines is a great
incentive to push local governments to improve deficient financial
reporting.185
2.

Michigan

Perhaps in response to critics alleging a lack of accountability and
oversight,186 Michigan enacted legislation in 2011 to improve its ability to

181. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-81-8.
182. Id. §§ 36-81-7, -8.1.
183. Id. § 50-8-3.
184. Id. § 36-80-16.
185. There are several noncompliant cities and twelve noncompliant counties. See
Memorandum from Greg S. Griffin, State Auditor of Georgia, to State Agency Heads (Sept. 19,
2014), available at http://www.audits.ga.gov/NALGAD/Files/September_2014_ memo _with _
listing.pdf.
186. See Study: Crucial Information Lacking on Local Government Debt, MICH. ST. U.
TODAY (Feb. 4, 2011), http://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2011/study-crucial-information-lackingon-local-government-debt/. For example, one study concluded that “Michigan should create a
better system for keeping tabs on the debt incurred by local governments—especially in these
tough economic times.” Id. That conclusion came as a result of economist Eric Scorsone’s
attempt to measure the health of Michigan’s municipal-bond market. Id. Scorsone “was unable
to finish the job due to a lack of state-level information on the debt owed by local
governments.” Id. As the study explained:
Through municipal bonds, Michigan’s 1,800 local governments borrow billions
of dollars and pay off the debt largely through property tax revenue. But this revenue
has plummeted as home values have fallen, . . . “and the aftermath of its impact will
continue in the public sector for some time to come.”
Id. (quoting Scorsone). Scorsone stated that “[m]uch of the local government revenue base is
predicated on those home values,” and “these falling revenue streams are the foundation for
much of the municipal bond repayment system.” Id.
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track data, and provided the measurements to the voters of the state.187 The
new legislation requires local governments to take action if fiscal issues
arise—an emergency-response function as highlighted above188—and also
provides procedures for more-extensive financial reviews if, after an initial
survey by a state auditor, the state determines there is a fiscal emergency.189
Michigan’s reforms are wide-ranging and should not be viewed solely
through the limited context of auditing functions. Indeed, the reforms actually
bring the state close to the types of authorization that the LGC enjoys in North
Carolina, although there is a requirement that the audit is initiated by the local
government, a petition of 5% of the locality’s voters, a creditor that was not
paid for over six months, or the employee pension fund.190 This initiation
requirement differs from the LGC, but the threshold needed to begin the
process appears to be relatively low.
While Michigan’s reforms are certainly helpful to bring local
governments out of fiscal insolvency, some critics point to the political issues
of allowing wholesale agency authority over local-government finance:
specifically, some critics dislike the removal of “choice” by forcing the
government to choose from four options, effectively curtailing the ability to
file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.191 This argument could certainly be levied
toward the LGC, perhaps with greater acrimony, as the LGC’s authority is
more far-reaching than Michigan’s.
Ultimately, one would hope that the relationship between state and local
governments is mutually beneficial. Many view the LGC, which provides
assistance in marketing debt for its localities, as a helpful partner for local

187. See Act of Mar. 16, 2011, No. 5, sec. 303, 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts xxix (codified as
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.2303 (2013)).
188. See Eric Scorsone, Frequently Asked Questions About the New Michigan Local
Financial Emergency Law, MICH. ST. U. 2 (Jan. 2013), http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/236/
25914/FAQ-WhyNewLawWasPassed.pdf. Scorsone’s report lists “factors that may trigger a
state financial review of a local government or school district,” including “[m]issed payroll or
bond payments,” “[f]ailure to comply with a state-ordered deficit elimination plan,” “[v]iolation
of local government debt or budgeting rules,” “[i]mposition of a court-ordered tax levy,” “[a]
very low credit rating,” and “[a]ny other facts that, in the state treasurer’s estimation, may
threaten the fiscal stability of the local government.” Id.
189. Id. at 3.
190. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 7; see generally Scorsone, supra note 188
(discussing the similarly structured legislation that passed after voters rejected the initial
legislation).
191. A Comprehensive Look at Michigan’s New(est) Emergency Manager Law, Now with
Stability and Choice!, ECLECTABLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.eclectablog.com/ 2013/02/acomprehensive-look-at-michigans-newest-emergency-manager-law-now-with-stabilitychoice.html.
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governments.192 However, because the state agency dictates the policy of a
local body and potentially limits that locality’s autonomy, there will always be
a fundamental tension between state and local governments under such stateled arrangements.
3.

Ohio

Ohio employs a fairly robust system of monitoring its local governments.
Through the State Auditor’s Office, Ohio monitors its local governments and
provides them with ratio indicators and benchmarks to assess financial
stability.193 Ohio offers its local governments low-cost accounting software.
However, if a locality chooses to use the software, the locality agrees to give
the state free access to analyze its financial information.194
The state auditor of Ohio uses the information gathered through the
software to determine whether and how far localities fall into differing levels
of fiscal distress. The first and least serious level of distress is “fiscal
caution.”195 The second level, known as “fiscal watch,” may be requested by
the governor or can be triggered by a number of statutory conditions.196 The
most serious category is labeled “fiscal emergency” and occurs if expenses
exceed revenues by one-sixth of the prior year’s revenues or through other
triggering events.197
D.

Summary

This Part provided a brief survey of other states’ practices to identify the
types of state oversight of local-government finance. Several states have
engaged in significant reforms to buttress the power of their local-government
debt-monitoring authorities, yet as Parts II and III will show, other states do
not place as much power in their institutions as North Carolina grants to the

192. K. Lee Carter, Jr., State Oversight of Local Government Finance, in STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 71, 77–78 (Charles D. Liner ed., 2d ed. 1995).
193. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.05 (West Supp. 2014).
194. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 1–2; Uniform Accounting Network,
OHIOAUDITOR.GOV, https://ohioauditor.gov/uan.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
195. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.025 (providing fiscal-caution guidelines for local
governments); id. § 3316.031 (West 2012) (providing fiscal-caution guidelines for school
districts).
196. Id. §§ 118.021–.023 (West 2002 & Supp. 2014); PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at
1–2. As of 2011, three cities were under fiscal watch, and eleven cities had graduated from that
status. Id. at 2.
197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.03 (West 2002). In 2011, twenty-four municipalities were
under the “fiscal emergency” status, and thirty-five had graduated from that status. PFM WHITE
PAPER, supra note 22, at 2.
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LGC. The remainder of this Article considers the history of the LGC, its
powers, and possible or problematic extensions of LGC authority.
II. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION: A BRIEF HISTORY
A.

Events Leading to the Creation of North Carolina’s Local
Government Commission

The LGC has its origins in the overall restructuring of North Carolina’s
county governments. Counties began to assume more responsibility for roads,
schools, maintenance of law and order, and operating the courts in the early
1900s.198 To administer these and other functions of county government,
different boards and commissions were created in the model of county school
boards.199 This resulted in a decentralized system of government in which
county boards raised funds for various governmental functions, and then
turned over the funds to the respective boards to expend.200 Additionally, after
the cessation of World War I, constituents began to request higher quality
services, even if it meant paying additional taxes.201
In early 1931, the total debt of all local-government units exceeded $350
million, an increase from less than $50 million before World War I.202 This
increase in debt was problematic for several reasons: bonds were issued
haphazardly with little regard for maturity schedules, inadequate provisions
were taken to address payments of principal, and the Depression’s
accompanying decline in property values decreased local governments’ ability
to repay their debt service.203 Further, North Carolina courts began to apply a
liberal construction of article V, section 4, of the North Carolina
constitution,204 which led local governments to take on a much greater load of
debt.205 The state had little to no authority to regulate debt, and the State
Sinking Fund Commission also lacked the power to handle bond defaults.206
Several reports were issued that pointed to potential solutions to these
looming problems, including reports from the North Carolina Association of
198. JOHN ALEXANDER MCMAHON, N.C. ASS’N CNTY. COMM’RS, THE NORTH CAROLINA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 1 (1960), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id
=mdp.39015081948138;view=1up;seq=16.
199. Id. at 1–2.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 5–6.
204. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4, cl. 2.
205. MCMAHON, supra note 198, at 5.
206. Id. at 6.
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County Commissioners, the North Carolina Tax Commission, and the Institute
for Government Research at the Brookings Institution.207 Generally, these
reports pointed to the need for uniform practices, and for state oversight of
debt issuance, management, and accounting.208
B.

Formation of the Local Government Commission

When the General Assembly convened in 1931, it formed the LGC by
passing the Local Government Act for the express purpose of reigning in the
issuances of debt by local governments.209 The LGC originally consisted of
nine members: the state auditor, the state treasurer, the commissioner of
revenue, and six members appointed by the governor, one of whom was the
director of local government.210 The LGC was given seven major tasks:
1. approve all bonds and notes proposed for issuance by a local
government;
2. sell all bonds and notes;
3. ensure the proper accounting of local governments’ funds;
4. ensure local governments pay interest and principal
promptly;
5. provide for uniform accounting practices among local
governments;
6. supervise local audits of financial statements; and
7. prevent the intermingling of public officers’ personal funds
from the funds of governments.211
Another feature of the Local Government Act was to make all cities,
towns, and counties subject to these requirements and to LGC oversight.212
207. Id. Particularly well known is the Brookings Institution report, which Governor Max
Gardner solicited and which has been seen as the genesis of the LGC. INST. FOR GOV’T
RESEARCH, BROOKINGS INST., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA 301–02 (1930), available
at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924014070506;view=1up;seq=5 (calling for the
creation of the Department of Local Government Finance, complete with an accounting and
debt administration function). A second report summarized many of the actions taken
thereafter. See A. T. ALLEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH
CAROLINA 80–115 (Paul V. Betters ed., 1932), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=mdp.39015065170725;view=1up;seq=7.
208. See MCMAHON, supra note 198, at 6.
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 8–9.
212. Id. at 9.
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The LGC was also tasked with reviewing the qualifications of all individuals
appointed as town accountants.213
In 1933, there was a small reorganization of the LGC, which made the
state treasurer the ex officio director of local government, and changed the
membership composition to four ex officio members and five appointees of
the governor.214 Two additional pieces of legislation in 1933 affected the
LGC’s operations: the first allowed local governments to issue term bonds in
the event of funding or refunding difficulties. The term bonds were to provide
needed flexibility in working out maturity schedules, and a separate provision
allowed holders of 51% of the bonds of a unit of government one year after a
default by the unit to demand that the LGC appoint a financial administrator
of the local government unit via the consent of a superior court judge.215
In 1935, the LGC was given authority to negotiate with creditors and
with the unit of government if the government had been in default for six
months.216 The LGC was also allowed to prepare a refunding plan, to approve
a refunding plan suggested by the unit or its creditors, and to put the approved
plan into operation.217 Additionally, the director of local government was to
approve and supervise unit budgets for as long as necessary.218
In 1936, there was a large change to local-government finance that
fundamentally changed the LGC’s role. A constitutional amendment was
passed that, in effect, required that “95% of all bond issues (other than funding
and refunding issues) . . . be approved by the voters” of an issuing local
government unit.219 This led the LGC to act as more of an advisor than an
approver of debt, since the General Assembly made clear that voters were to
be the final decision-makers when local governments were considering the
authorization of new debt.220
In spite of the changes, the LGC was very successful during this period
in reducing the amount of debt incurred by local governments. Total
outstanding bond indebtedness reached a peak of $362 million in mid-1932,
and a low of $241 million by mid-1946.221 Because of the strict nature of
LGC oversight, local-government indebtedness decreased by more than $30
million between 1931 and 1936.222 Upon undertaking a more advisory role
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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after 1936, the LGC worked to proactively address potential defaults in the
pre-issuance phase.223 The LGC also sold a number of bonds on behalf of
local governments during this period, selling over $803 million in bonds over
its first thirty years ($618 million of which was new debt).224 The LGC’s
power to approve refinancing plans also paid dividends: at the peak of defaults
in 1933, 62 counties, 152 cities and towns, and 200 districts had defaulted on
their bonds.225 By 1942, only six small towns were still in default.226 The
LGC also corrected problems with inadequate securitization of sinking fund
assets and improper investments.227 Moreover, the LGC implemented controls
over local audits and developed uniform systems of accounting during this
period.228
C.

The Local Government Commission Today

The LGC has changed considerably since the period of defaults that
necessitated its existence. Today there are three sections of the LGC: the
Authorizations and Negotiated Bond Sales Section, the Competitive Bond
Sales and State and Local Government Debt Records Section, and the Fiscal
Management Section.229 The LGC underwent a significant restructuring in the
1990s, primarily due to a proliferation of types of debt that went beyond
traditional general obligation bonds. These types included revenue bonds,
special obligation bonds, and installment purchase financing.230 The LGC also
handles industrial revenue bonds, issues for higher-education entities, and
issues for private nonprofit hospitals.231
In working with these transactions, the LGC holds a pre-issuing
conference where the LGC discusses the appropriate debt instruments, capital
plans, revenue streams, tax-collection rates, and other indicia of a unit’s ability
to repay its proposed debt.232 The staff of the LGC is primarily involved in
this stage of the negotiations, and the LGC itself ultimately decides whether or
not the debt will be issued.233 The LGC also sells and markets the bonds

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16–17.
See Carter, supra note 192, at 76.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
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through its Bond Sales Division, and then monitors the unit’s ability to repay
the debt through its Fiscal Management Section.234
The LGC’s influence has continued to prevent bond defaults in North
Carolina. Since 1942, after refinancing the Depression-era defaults, no localgovernment unit has failed to meet a bond obligation.235 Further, all three
ratings agencies that determine the creditworthiness of state- and localgovernment bonds have provided North Carolina with consistently high
ratings, stating that “North Carolina’s oversight model is one of the strongest
of any state.”236
Lastly, while the LGC prefers to act in an advisory role rather than a
regulatory role,237 it has used its power to assume control of three towns’
finances: the Town of East Spencer in 2001,238 Enfield, and Princeville.239
The LGC often avoids assuming control of a town’s finances by issuing
warning letters to towns that are suffering from fiscal difficulties (as it has
recently in the Town of Maxton, Scotland County, and Chowan County),240
but the LGC has shown that it will take action if a town is in danger of
defaulting on its debt.

234. Id. at 77–78.
235. See Fehr, supra note 29.
236. Id. (quoting Andrew Teras, an associate director of the Standard & Poor rating agency).
This is in part because of a policy requiring high levels of fund balance (between 5% and 15%,
with a recommended level of 8%). Id.
237. See Carter, supra note 192, at 80.
238. See Fehr, supra note 29.
239. Mark Wineka, State Takes Control of East Spencer’s Finances, SALISBURY POST (Oct.
24, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20061103042245/http://www.salisburypost.com/2001
oct/102401m.htm. Princeville remains in financial distress, and was taken over again in July
2012. See John Frank, Princeville Mayor Arrested on Embezzlement Charges, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/07/3089729_ princevillemayor-arrested-on.html?rh=1.
240. See Fehr, supra note 29 (noting that the former town manager overestimated revenue
for several years and refused to cut expenditures after these errors were identified). Leading
officials in Maxton recently laid off two public safety employees and are currently considering
what else should be done to return the town to solvency. Id. Scotland County received a
warning letter when its fund balance fell from 9% to 6% in one year. Id. The LGC barred new
debt issuances to Chowan County after several years of inaccurate revenue calculations. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/5

38

Parker: Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-Gove

2015]

POSITIVE LIBERTY IN PUBLIC FINANCE

145

III. POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION
A.

Approving Debt
1.

The LGC’s Process for Approving Debt

Approval of debt is one of the three primary missions of the LGC.241
This is a unique proactive feature of the LGC compared to several other stateoversight mechanisms. As discussed earlier, there are at least two states that
require local governments to obtain approval from a state administrative
agency before allowing the local government to issue debt: Louisiana and
North Carolina.242 Indiana is another state that may require approval by a state
agency, but ten or more taxpayers must first file an objection to the local bond
issue.243 Control boards also sprang up in the wake of the issues in Orange
County, California, for specific jurisdictions.244
The LGC differs in that it is legally responsible for the approval of nearly
all local-government debt.245 There are several steps involved in the LGC’s
241. See About the Local Government Commission, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, http://
www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Pages/Local-Government-Commission.aspx (last visited Nov. 14,
2014). The other two primary responsibilities of the LGC are marketing debt after approval and
regulating the annual financial reporting done by local government units. Id.
242. See LA. CONST. art. VI, pt. II, § 33; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36:769, 36:802, 39:871 (2014) (requiring approval from the State Bond Commission, which
is part of the Department of Treasury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-172 (2013) (requiring all localgovernment notes to be approved by the Local Government Commission before issuance); see
also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 350.0115, .014 (2011) (requiring prior approval from Debt
Management Commission for the county in which local government is located).
243. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-20-6 (West 2010).
244. Barbara Flickinger & Katherine McManus, Bankruptcy Aftershocks: Have Public
Finance Foundations Been Shaken?, PUB. MGMT., Jan. 1996, at 16, 2122 (discussing control
boards in Washington, D.C., New York City, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Yonkers, Bridgeport,
New Haven, and Chicago). Indeed, when some of these cities gave up their finance and
budgeting decisions to the control board, their debt ratings were positively affected. Id. at 22.
For a discussion of the difficulties faced by Orange County, California, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
245. See Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina
Approach, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 2007, at 39, 41. This Article uses the term “nearly all”
in the context of local-government debt because there are certain types of local-government
debt that do not require the LGC’s approval, although Professor Coe cites to Professor David
Lawrence’s text for the proposition that all North Carolina debt must be approved by the LGC.
Id. I did not read Professor Lawrence’s text to say that all North Carolina local government
debt must be approved, but that most types of debt require LGC approval. See LAWRENCE,
supra note 8, § 400, at 93 (noting that the LGC “must review and approve most proposed
borrowings by local governments, and the commission’s explicit concern is with the unit’s
capacity to repay the proposed debt”). Part III.A.2 provides a discussion of the types requiring
approval.
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approval of debt, but the majority of these considerations are not within the
statute.246 The statutory-approval requirements of the LGC often overlap: for
example, the statutory-approval mechanism of the LGC itself appears in
sections 159-50 to -53 of the North Carolina General Statutes, as well as
within the regulations promulgated by the state treasurer.247
Before consideration of the local government’s debt approval, the LGC
must first follow through on a number of basic steps. With general obligation
bonds, for example, the LGC first conducts a preliminary conference with the
issuing local government unit to discuss the proposed debt issuance.248 The
local government must then publish notice of its intent to apply to the LGC.249
If the bond is for school construction, the school board or a board of trustees
proposing to issue a school bond must adopt a resolution.250 If a local
government is seeking to issue the bonds, the governing board must adopt a
resolution. The local unit then makes its application to the LGC.251
Each individual bond type also has different metrics when being
considered for approval, although there are overlaps within the process. For
example, when examining general obligation bonds, the statute provides that
the LGC may consider the following factors:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Whether the undertaking is necessary or expedient.
The nature of the unit’s outstanding debt.
The unit’s debt management policies and procedures.
The unit’s tax and special assessment collection record.
The unit’s compliance with the Local Government Budget
and Fiscal Control Act.
Whether the unit is in default on its debt obligations.
The unit’s present tax rates and necessary increases to pay its
obligations.
The unit’s property values.
The ability of the unit to sustain additional taxes, if
necessary.

246. The majority of the indicators used by the LGC are not within the statute. See Kimhi,
Reviving Cities, supra note 38, at 680 n.256. The LGC’s seven indicators were developed by
the staff of the organization. See id. (“[T]he LGC uses the following types of indicators: three
indicators examine the local revenues and expenditures, two examine the localities’ operating
position, one examines unfunded liabilities, and one examines legal or technical violations.”).
247. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 402A, at 95.
248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-51 (2013).
249. Id. § 159-50.
250. Id. §§ 115C-503, -521.
251. Id. § 159-51.
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The ability of the Commission to market the proposed bonds
at reasonable interest rates.
If the proposed contract is for utility or public service, what
the net revenues of the undertaking will be.
Whether the amount of the proposed debt will be adequate to
accomplish the purpose for which it is incurred.
If the proposed bond issue is for a water system, whether the
unit has prepared a water supply plan.252

The LGC is to approve the application if it can determine:
x
x
x
x
x

The proposed bond issue is necessary or expedient.
That the amount proposed is adequate and not excessive for
the purpose.
That the unit’s debt management policies are sound and that
the unit will meet its obligations.
That, if necessary, [any] increase in taxes to meet the
contractual obligations will not be excessive.
That the proposed bonds can be marketed at reasonable rates
of interest.253

Approval for revenue bonds has a very similar type of approval structure,
although it removes the language discussing sufficient tax revenues (revenue
streams from the funded enterprise, rather than the taxing power, is the object
of the pledge) and adds language regarding whether the proposed project is
feasible.254 If the LGC approves the debt, the local government then
undertakes formal steps to officially approve the debt, and may even conduct
an election if a general obligation bond is under consideration.255

252. Id. § 159-52(a).
253. Id. § 159-52(b).
254. Id. § 159-161.
255. See id. § 159-54 (providing for a local government to set a hearing date for the bond
issue); id. § 159-55 (requiring the local government to file a statement of debt with the clerk to
the board); id. §§ 159-56 to -57 (requiring the local government to publish a bond order and
notice of hearing); id. § 159-57 (requiring the local government to hold a public hearing and
adopt a bond order); id. § 159-61 (requiring the local government to publish a notice of the
referendum for a general obligation bond). Sections 159-61, 163-182.5, and 163-302 provide
for election requirements. For a convenient chart of this process, see LAWRENCE, supra note 8,
§ 202B, at 44–45.
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The Types of Debt that Require LGC Approval

There are four types of local-government debt that always require LGC
approval: general obligation bonds,256 revenue bonds,257 special obligation
bonds,258 and project development financing bonds.259 Other types of debt
financing typically, but do not always, require LGC approval.260 These
include installment purchase debt,261 certain contracts relating to leases, the
acquisition or construction of capital,262 and other financial arrangements.263

256. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-43 to -79; see also id. §§ 159-160
to -165, 159G-40.
257. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-210.1 to .7 (set to expire July 1, 2015); id. §§ 159-80
to -97, -161; id. §§ 160A-239.1 to .7 (set to expire July 1, 2015).
258. See id. §§ 159-53, -86, -148, 159I-13, -15, -30. Moreover, if there is an additional
security pledged for the special obligation bond, it may be subject to LGC approval. See id.
§§ 159-148, 159I-30. Section 159-148 requires LGC oversight if all of the following conditions
are met:
(1) [The bond contract] extends for five or more years from the date of the
contract . . . .
(2) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit to pay sums to another, without regard
to whether the payee is a party to the contract.
(3) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit over the full term of the contract,
including periods that may be added to the original term through the exercise of
options to renew or extend:
(a) For baseball park districts, to at least $500,000.
(b) For housing authorities, to at least $500,000 or a sum equal to $2,000 per
housing unit owned and under active management by the housing authority, whichever
is less.
(c) For other units, to at least $500,000 or . . . one tenth of [1%] of the assessed
value of property subject to taxation by the contracting unit, whichever is less.
(4) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit, expressly or by implication, to
exercise its power to levy taxes either to make payments falling due under the
contract, or to pay any judgment entered against the unit as a result of the unit’s breach
of the contract.
Id. § 159-148.
259. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-48, -103, -105.
260. For a comprehensive blog post describing the different types of debt that require LGC
approval, see Kara Millonzi, Local Government Commission (LGC) Approval of Contracts,
Leases, and Other (Non-Debt) Financing Agreements, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L.
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6786.
261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-528, 115D-58.15, 159-148, -151, 160A-20; Wayne Cnty.
Citizens Ass’n for Better Tax Control v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 399 S.E.2d 311, 313–14
(N.C. 1991).
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-148.
263. Id.; see also id. §§ 159-153, 160A-20(e). These include financings “whereby a local
government entity approves or otherwise participates in the incurrence of indebtedness (or a
similar financing arrangement) by another entity on the local government entity’s behalf.”
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Installment purchase contracts must comply with the provisions
contained in section 159-148 of the North Carolina General Statutes relating
to contract length and amount before they are required to have LGC
approval.264 Similarly, for contracts relating to lease, acquisition or capital
construction projects, there are minimum thresholds for the amount of
financing that is required before the debt needs LGC approval.265 Lastly, there
are specific financing agreements exempted from LGC approval under
section 160A-20(e) of the General Statutes regarding contracts with the
federal and state governments, motor vehicle contracts, voting machine
contracts, and loans with the North Carolina Solid Waste Management
Program.266
An urban redevelopment commission, administered by the local
government, is another method by which a local government may issue debt
without LGC approval.267 By statute, cities and counties may act as urban
redevelopment commissions, which includes the ability to borrow money from
federal, state, or local governments, or from any other source without being
subject to approval by the LGC.268
3.

The LGC’s Criteria for Approving Debt

By statute, the LGC must consider the factors listed for each type of
debt.269 These factors, however, are somewhat vague and leave a considerable
amount of interpretation to the LGC staff. The North Carolina Administrative
Millonzi, supra note 260, at 3. An example of this type is where a nonprofit corporation
borrows money to construct a facility and then conveys the property to a local government at
the end of a financing, which the government approves. Id. Section 153 also includes a “catchall provision” to cover future transactions that are similar to a local government borrowing
money, but that are not explicitly listed in the statute. Id.
264. For a discussion of the section 159-148 requirements, see supra note 258 and
accompanying text.
265. Id.
266. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-148, -153, 160A-20(e).
267. Id. § 160A-505.
268. Id. §§ 160A-512(8), -516. One reading of the North Carolina statutes is that if a local
government acts as a redevelopment commission, it assumes the place of the redevelopment
commission within the urban-redevelopment law under section 160A-505. The local
government, acting as a commission, could then issue debt under sections 160A-512(8) and
160A-516 that is not subject to LGC approval. Taken one step further, if the purposes of the
urban-redevelopment law are defined broadly, a local government would have wide discretion
in how it spends these funds. The redevelopment commission may also provide several types of
security for bonds, including a pledge of all gross rents, fees, and revenues, a mortgage on its
property, future revenues, or other securities that make the bonds marketable. Id. § 160A-517;
see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW FOR NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 80–81 (2000) (discussing this method of local-government financing).
269. See, e.g., supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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Code provides some guidance concerning what the LGC will discuss with a
local unit at its preliminary conference concerning debt obligations,270 along
with requirements for all documents submitted to bond counsel in connection
with the sale of these bonds.271
There are many other internal processes used by the LGC to ensure that
local governments maintain strong financial health. The LGC’s staff places
communities that are in the “worst fiscal shape” on a “watch list.”272 A key
indicator used to determine these distinctions is fund balance, which is simply
a level of reserves (or savings) maintained by a local government.273 The
LGC requires 8% of operating expenses to be held in fund balance to protect
against unanticipated events, like natural disasters or budgetary shortfalls, and
the LGC will not approve a bond issue if fund balance is below that
threshold.274 The LGC also sends letters to local governing boards to draw
their attention to financial concerns as needed, and to provide assistance to
local governments currently experiencing difficulties.275
B.

Marketing and Selling Debt

The Competitive Bond Sales and State and Local Government Debt
Records Section of the LGC helps to conduct all bond sales on behalf of local
governments, which is especially beneficial for smaller local governments that
might otherwise have difficulty budgeting their debt.276 This division handles
the sale and delivery of competitively sold bonds, including the preparation of
the “official statements,” which act as marketing tools for these debt
instruments.277 Other states have a more extensive function in which they
couple and sell debt in packages, also known as “pooling programs”;278
270. 20 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 3.0202(a) (2014). That provision states that if a preliminary
conference is held, it may include (1) “the proposed uses for proceeds of the bond issue,” (2)
“the legality or appropriateness of the bond issue,” (3) “the adequacy of the accounting and
internal control systems of the governmental unit,” (4) “the application procedure and the
documents required,” and (5) any “other matters as the Secretary deems appropriate.” Id.
271. Id. r. 3.0203.
272. See Fehr, supra note 29.
273. Id. Note, however, that many local governments in North Carolina retain a fund
balance greater than 8%. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Coe, supra note 245, at 42–43.
276. See Carter, supra note 192, at 78.
277. Id.; see also Note, supra note 27, at 509–10 (describing the process of marketing localgovernment debt).
278. See, e.g., Indiana Bond Bank: Pool Program, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/tos/bond/
2409.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing a “bond bank” in Indiana that assists smaller
communities with long-term debt financing and requires projects larger than $100,000 to be
designed as seven- to thirty-year financings).
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however, this is not a current feature of the LGC (although it is a ripe
consideration for a future addition to the LGC).279
C.

Auditing Debt

Debt auditing is a common function across many states, and it remains a
function of the LGC.280 The Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control
Act requires that two reports are made to the LGC: (1) a report concerning the
status of deposits and investments in the unit,281 and (2) the Annual Financial
Information Report (sometimes also known as a Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report, or a CAFR),282 which contains information that the LGC
makes public,283 and which is also used by the LGC to determine whether any
violations have occurred.284
D.

Removal and Takeover Provisions

The LGC can order local governments to issue semiannual reports on
deposits and investments.285 Additionally, the LGC can order a local
government to appropriate additional funds to cover its debt-service
obligations if the locality is behind in its payments.286 If the LGC finds faulty
controls within a local government’s financial structure, it can also order
improvements to certain processes.287
279. Another example can be found in Vermont, where the state operates the Vermont Bond
Bank. See VT. MUN. BOND BANK, http://www.vmbb.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
280. Auditing functions are not as cut-and-dried as they might seem. Facing fiscal distress,
several local and state governments have engaged in practices that some argue are “gimmicks”
to make a government’s balance sheet appear in better health than it truly is. See generally
Eileen Norcross, Fiscal Evasion in State Budgeting (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason U.,
Working Paper No. 10-39, 2010), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication
/Norcross.Fiscall%20Evasion.%20State%20Budget%20Gimmicks.%20Updated%208.23.10.pdf
(describing the manifold issues that state governments encounter when auditing local
governments).
281. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33 (2013).
282. Id. § 159-33.1.
283. The local governments’ information is published on the State Treasurer’s website. See
Financial Analysis Tools and Reports, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, https://www.nctreasurer.
com/slg/lfm/financial-analysis/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
284. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33.1; see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA § 1202, at 242–43 (2d ed. 1990).
285. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33.
286. Id. § 159-36.
287. Id. § 159-25(c). Under section 159-25(c),
The [LGC] has authority to issue rules and regulations having the force of law
governing procedures for the receipt, deposit, investment, transfer, and disbursement
of money and other assets by units of local government and public authorities, may
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Further, knowingly refusing to obey an LGC order may result in criminal
penalties.288 The LGC may also remove individuals from office.289
Additionally, if the local unit is not cooperative, the LGC may impound the
entity’s financial records and assume control of its financial affairs.290 These
standing takeover powers are a unique function of the LGC compared to other
states’ oversight mechanisms, and while they are used sparingly, they have
been exercised to avert financial crises in a small number (four) of localgovernment entities.291 Finally, a local government cannot file for bankruptcy
unless the LGC approves such a filing.292 Since the LGC began overseeing
local-government debt, there has only been one filing by a nontraditional unit
of government: the South Brunswick Water and Sewer Authority.293
E.

A Holistic Approach to Local-Government Debt Oversight

The LGC is extensively involved at every step of the debt-approval
process. By design and through its administrative procedures, the LGC offers
thoughtful, proactive regulation of local-government debt at every step of a
local government’s budgetary process for debt management. The LGC has
built-in functions for continued oversight, including the ability to dictate a
local government’s fiscal decisions if necessary. The LGC staff evaluates
debt before it is issued, considers financial statements and debt ratios while
the debt is outstanding, and guides the debt issues to their eventual conclusion.
The certainty surrounding the agency has created a form of “credit
enhancement” for ratings agencies when they view North Carolina’s localgovernment debt, and also provides a level of certainty for local governments
to operate within.294 This is especially comforting to investors, as even the
inquire into and investigate the internal control procedures of a local government or
public authority, and may require any modifications in internal control procedures
which, in the opinion of the [LGC], are necessary or desirable to prevent
embezzlements or mishandling of public moneys.
Id.
288. Id. § 159-181.
289. Id. § 159-182.
290. Id. § 159-181.
291. For example, the Town of Princeville has twice been taken over by the LGC and is
currently being investigated for improper financial reporting. See Beau Minnick, SBI
Investigating Spending by Princeville Officials, WRAL.COM (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.wral.
com/sbi-investigating-spending-by-princeville-officials/12316307/; Coe, supra note 245, at
4445 (discussing four instances where the LGC assumed control over a local government:
Princeville, Enfield, East Spencer, and the South Brunswick Water and Sewer Authority).
292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48.
293. See Voluntary Petition, In re S. Brunswick Water & Sewer Auth., No. 04-09053-8-JRL
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2004).
294. See Fehr, supra note 29.
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most secure forms of public debt—general obligation bonds—have recently
faced uncertainty.295 The number of “emergencies” that the LGC has had to
respond to have also been limited, as the LGC takes care of most instabilities
on the front end by denying approval for debt or working with the local
government in its preliminary conference.296 Laying out the ground rules for
all local governments and imposing fiscal responsibility for their actions—as
opposed to the vague notion that the state will bail the locality out if distress is
great enough—creates an environment where political leaders take a higher
level of responsibility for their financial decision-making.
IV. RECENT CHANGES TO THE LGC AND OTHER POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS
This Part considers the arguments for extension of the LGC’s authority
into different areas, drawing upon specific examples in North Carolina.
Additionally, this Part examines legislation passed by the General Assembly
in 2013 that altered the LGC’s authority to assume control of water and sewer
systems. This Part also argues that delegating oversight to the LGC over
pension funds, economic-development activities, and school boards is not
appropriate for the LGC’s structure. Specifically, this Part argues that staterun investment funds gain little by applying a lateral level of oversight, that
some decisions relating to economic development are political in nature and
thus fall outside the scope of the LGC’s proper authority, and that revenuecollection limitations within school boards make LGC control less practical
and less effective. Finally, this Part critiques a recent move by the LGC, in
which it offered “guidelines” by imposing a categorical bar against certain
types of debt financing, rather than adopting regulations or proposing
legislation.

295. See NAT’L ASS’N BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW,
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS i (Aug. 2014), http://www.nabl.org/uploads/
cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf. The National
Association of Bond Lawyers described this uncertainty surrounding general obligation bonds:
Recent events, including the bankruptcy filings by Jefferson County, Alabama, and
the City of Detroit, Michigan, have raised questions about the security of general
obligation bonds and challenged the commonly held general assumptions [about
general obligation bonds]. It has become apparent that all general obligations bonds
do not enjoy the same security or the same remedies for enforcement of the promise
to pay under state or local law. Further, the treatment of general obligation bonds in
a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case is uncertain and will depend on the security provided by
applicable state law.
Id.
296. See Fehr, supra note 29 (discussing the LGC’s denial of loan requests from the Town
of Navassa, Scotland County, and Chowan County).
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Recent Changes from 2013 and 2014

In 2013, legislation was introduced to allow the LGC to assume control
of a water/sewer enterprise if “for three consecutive fiscal years, the audited
financial statements of the unit” had any of three conditions: (1) negative
working capital; (2) a quick ratio of less than 1.0; or (3) the unit or public
authority experienced a net loss of revenue.297 The LGC must find that the
impacts of these three items, in tandem, create instability in the financial
affairs of the unit and that the public authority or unit of government has failed
to take corrective measures.298 Finally, the LGC must provide warnings and
notice to any authority or unit of government lacking compliance under the
statute. This legislation passed without opposition in 2013.299
A large concern regarding the new law is that the nature of an enterprise,
such as a water/sewer entity, usually requires special expertise to
administer.300 However, the new law concerns a utility that is typically
operated by a local unit of government, or by a group of local governments
through an interlocal agreement or other regional governmental entities.301
One might assume that the ability to set rates, to rely on technical expertise of
the water system’s staff, and the similarity in nature to a local government
would make these types of governmental water authorities appropriate for
LGC oversight.302

297. S.B. 207, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013). The bill provides that
“‘working capital’ means current assets, such as cash, inventory, and accounts receivable, less
current liabilities, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and
the phrase ‘quick ratio of less than 1.0’ means that the ratio of liquid assets, cash and
receivables, to current liabilities is less than 1.0.” Id.
298. Id.
299. Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 150, § 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 358, 358 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159-181(d) (2013)).
300. For an example of the complexities that come with administering water- and
wastewater-management systems, see Projects and Programs, UNC ENVTL. FIN. CTR.,
http://www.efc.sog.unc.edu/content/projects-and-programs (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(discussing several considerations regarding rate structures, business models, irrigation policies,
and more).
301. For a discussion of these regional water entities, see Shadi Eskaf, Tips on
Regionalization: Crafting Interlocal Water Agreements and Water System Interconnections,
UNC ENVTL. FIN. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.efc.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.efc.sog.unc.
edu/files/TipsforRegionalization_0.pdf. Note that the private water systems would not be
included in the proposed legislation. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
302. One other change from the General Assembly is that the LGC now also oversees loan
applications from the State Department of Transportation from the infrastructure-banking
program. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18.
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Pension Oversight by the LGC

Oversight of pensions in North Carolina is handled entirely by the State
Treasurer’s Office,303 of which the LGC is a part. While pension obligation
bonds are fraught with issues, both pension obligation bonds and the pension
fund involve investment functions304 that an LGC-style organization is not
suited to handle. The LGC is essentially designed to audit, correct, and
market local-government debt—the group is not an investment house designed
to grow a portfolio. Additionally, the state treasurer administers localgovernment retirement benefits305 via an opt-in provision.306 Tasking the LGC
with this oversight seems redundant and may create a conflict of interest307
between two parts of the same statewide office.308 If a system is administered
by the state, it may make sense for the federal government to oversee and
impose requirements on pension systems to ensure solvency and to
appropriate fund balances, benefits offered, and investment strategies.309

303. Get the Facts: The North Carolina Pension System, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER 1,
https://www.nctreasurer.com/ret/Active%20Employees/PensionFactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb.
3, 2015) (noting that the North Carolina pension system “supports the more than 820,000
current and former public employees in North Carolina” and that the “pension fund is managed
by the North Carolina Department of State Treasurer”). The fund is $72.4 billion in size and is
the fourteenth largest in the United States, as well as the thirty-second largest in the world. Id.
304. See Eric Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or Smart Investment?,
GOVERNING (Jan. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-workforce/pensions/govpension-obligation-bonds-risky-or-smart.html (“[Pension obligation bonds] are a financing
maneuver that allows states and local governments to ‘wipe out’ unfunded pension liabilities by
borrowing against future tax revenue, then investing the proceeds in equities or other high-yield
investments.”). Schulzke asserts that pension obligation bonds “have bankrupted whole cities.”
Id.
305. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-21 to -38.10.
306. Id. § 128-33.
307. But cf. 2 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19, § 12:13, at 12-53 to -55 (discussing
state oversight of state bonds and notes).
308. This is not to say that there should be no state assistance and oversight where local
governments administer their own pension system. For examples of how some local
governments have mismanaged pension funds, see Schulzke, supra note 304 (describing two
California cities that issued overly generous pensions and subsequently went bankrupt).
309. See generally Allan Beckmann, Pension Obligation Bonds: Are States and Localities
Behaving Themselves or Do the Feds Need to Get Involved? (Spring 2010) (unpublished
M.P.A. capstone paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http://
www.mpa.unc.edu/sites/www.mpa.unc.edu/files/AllanBeckmann.pdf (arguing that the federal
government should coordinate with the Government Finance Officers Association to encourage
states issuing pension obligation bonds to follow “best practices” and to consider whether
current regulations are appropriate). Indeed, some convincingly argue that pension obligations
in certain states have led to increased costs of borrowing for states and local governments due to
the strength of public sector employee unions. See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 5, at 26468.
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Oversight of School Finance

Unsuccessful legislation was offered to provide local school districts in
North Carolina with the ability to impose property taxes, and also for the LGC
to oversee how those local school districts spent their revenues.310 A local
school district would be more analogous to a local unit of government if it
possessed the statutory authority to impose taxes. In their current form,
however, North Carolina schools do not possess this power.311 The LGC
model is an improper fit for North Carolina schools as they currently operate
because a forced takeover of a school district would not bring with it the
ability to raise revenues and decrease expenditures.312
This lack of flexibility would give the LGC only one tool to balance a
school system’s budget in the event the county or state fails to supply more
property tax funds of their own volition—to cut expenses. This also puts the
LGC squarely into a political fight, whereby it will have to lobby another
board for funds to solve a fiscal crisis. One only need look to the early
examples in Florida for a worst-case scenario of that conversation.313
D.

LGC Oversight of Economic-Development Activities

Others call for the LGC to have greater oversight authority over
economic-development activities of local governments.314 Supporters of this
suggestion, which particularly target tax increment financing (TIF) within
North Carolina as an area for greater LGC oversight, want the LGC to

310. See H.B. 955, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013) (referred to the H.
Comm. on Rules, Calendar, and Operations of the House two days after the bill was filed, with
no further action taken during the remainder of the 2013-2014 Session).
311. See T. Keung Hui, N.C. Bill Would Block School Boards from Suing County
Commissioners for More Money, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.
newsobserver.com/2013/04/21/2841341/nc-bill-would-block-school-boards.html
(“North
Carolina school districts don’t have taxing authority so they request money from their county
board of commissioners for facility needs. School boards also ask commissioners to
supplement amounts they get from the state and federal government for day-to-day needs in the
operating budget.”).
312. Some support providing school districts with taxing authority because it would make
the school accountable for its policy choices. See Renee Chou, Calls Grow to Give School
Boards Taxing Authority, WRAL.COM (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/
2614055/.
313. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
314. JOHN LOCKE FOUND., SPOTLIGHT NO. 350, COMMON-SENSE TIF REFORMS 1–3 (May 28,
2008), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/spotlights/spotlight-350-tifreforms.pdf (calling for
greater oversight by the LGC regarding the feasibility of projects).
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examine the feasibility of the project, along with the other traditional indicia
of financial solvency that the LGC uses.315
The problem with this approach is that these reforms essentially ask the
LGC to wade into political waters: rather than simply determining whether a
project is financially feasible, the LGC is being asked to determine whether a
project is advisable. While the LGC may already informally remark on the
wisdom of such projects, asking the LGC to deny local-government debt when
it has sufficient assurances that the debt will be paid off defeats the purpose of
the organization. If the LGC is meant to keep local governments from
defaulting on their debt obligations, thereby keeping debt service rates low for
all local governments, it has done its job in areas such as Roanoke Rapids,
which is often held up as a reason to adjust the LGC structure in North
Carolina.316
Going beyond the LGC’s purpose to prohibit financially sound debtmanagement schemes based on whether or not the LGC agrees with the
purported use of the debt is a step too far, and it restricts local governments’
abilities to finance new projects on the basis of normative judgments made by
an unelected arm of a state agency.317 Rather, local governing boards and the
General Assembly—not the LGC—are better suited to weigh the advisability
of a proposed project.
In other words, this approach exerts too much positive liberty at the
expense of local-government flexibility, or negative liberty. Incentives,
unwise development projects, and successful forms of economic development
do not necessarily impact the ability of other governments to provide their
own incentives or to engage in debt financing to spur economic development

315. Id.
316. Id. For a discussion of the Roanoke Rapids TIF in North Carolina, see Adam C.
Parker, Comment, Still as Moonlight: Why Tax Increment Financing Stalled in North Carolina,
91 N.C. L. REV. 661, 697700 (2013). Roanoke Rapids has experienced significant difficulties
with its TIF structure since the initial theater tenant, Randy Parton and the Moonlight Bandits,
were dismissed from their managerial duties. Id. at 663. Multiple attempts to sell the theater
failed, although the town has now successfully partnered with a tenant for two years who also
intends to purchase the theater from the city. See Khai Hoang, City, HSV Entertainment Strike
New Lease Agreement on Theater, DAILY HERALD (Roanoke Rapids, N.C.) (July 4, 2014, 6:00
AM), http://www.rrdailyherald.com/news/city-hsv-entertainment-strike-new-lease-agreementon-theater/article_a03f5460-030f-11e4-890c-001a4bcf887a.html.
317. One may argue that because the state treasurer is elected, this point about an unelected
body making decisions for an elected local-government board is moot. Ultimately, denying
financing based on personal preference and “best judgment” seems to violate the state
treasurer’s functions and core purposes in this area, which involve the issuance and monitoring
of all local-government debt, including the amount of debt. See State and Local Government:
Local Debt, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, http://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Pages/Local-Debt.aspx
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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as long as there are no defaults or bankruptcies. If anything, a local
government’s fiscal decisions—good or bad—will offer a competitive
advantage to surrounding governments by spurring neighboring localities of
prosperous units to achieve the same prosperity or by granting a competitive
edge to neighboring localities of units suffering from unwise fiscal planning.
E.

One Area of Criticism

For a number of years, the LGC has operated in a space where it enjoyed
the administrative flexibility to approve or disapprove debt without offering
public statements explaining its decision.318 Rather than approving
administrative regulations through rulemaking or other legislative processes,
the LGC worked with units informally or issued “guidelines” about localgovernment practices.319
Recently, the LGC has put forth additional “guidelines” (which are in
effect more similar to codified “rules”) to advise bond attorneys and local
governments about its decision-making process.320 Even so, the LGC has not
yet engaged in a rulemaking proceeding, which it is likely required to do if the
LGC intends for these “guidelines” to have any legal effect.321 Additionally,
some of these policies have been enforced in a non-uniform way, particularly
within the area of refinancing debt initially purchased by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA).322 Despite its informal method of
318. See Note, supra note 27, at 498–99 (noting that the LGC could approve or disapprove
debt under thirteen broad bases, and that approval was often, in practice, determined via an
informal conference before the full-commission vote). The ability to override the LGC was also
unlikely to be successful, as a sale of bonds disapproved of by the LGC was likely to be seen as
less marketable. Id. at 499–500.
319. See, e.g., Guidelines on Debt Issuance (Revised), N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER (Mar. 27,
2007), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Debt%20Management/GuidelinesforDebtIssuanceFinal
2.pdf.
320. See Bob Jessup, The LGC’s Proposed Maturity Guidelines Are Unfair, N.C. PUB. FIN.
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://ncpublicfinance.com/2014/02/24/the-lgcs-proposed-maturity-guidelinesare-unfair/.
321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a) (2013) (“‘Rule’ means any . . . statement of general
applicability . . . that describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.”).
322. See Bob Jessup, An Update on the LGC Maturity Guidelines Project—Still No Freedom
to Refund, N.C. PUB. FIN. (June 6, 2014), http://ncpublicfinance.com/2014/06/06/ an-update-onthe-lgc-maturity-guidelines-project-still-no-freedom-to-refund/ (noting that eighteen months
after announcing the guideline that encourages local governments not to apply for refinancing
of USDA debt, the Town of Tabor City had that exact type of financing approved, despite
others being denied due to the “guideline”). This particular debate has even led to a bit of
“forum-shopping” with LGC staffers, as Jessup notes: “Some outside the LGC have suggested
that you may be able to get these applications approved if you send the material to the right
staffer and don’t mention a conflict with the guidelines. I think we can all agree that’s no way
for the system to operate.” Id.
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administration, the LGC’s relationship with local governments remains
important because the LGC approves and helps to market local-government
debt, which perhaps lessens the local governments’ appetites to draw the LGC
into litigation.
Nonetheless, although a rulemaking process may prove cumbersome or
onerous to pass into legislation, the LGC should engage in a formalized
process. The alternative is to keep administrative discretion in the hands of
the LGC staff, enabling them to determine whether a project is feasible on a
case-by-case basis by weighing the useful life of an asset, realized savings,
costs of financing, and other relevant factors.
The creation of “guidelines” with non-uniform enforcement is effectively
neither of these options and should be discontinued. It seems unlikely that a
local government would litigate this matter for two reasons. First, all local
governments have an interest in maintaining a positive relationship with the
LGC. After all, the LGC determines whether it will approve a local
government’s debt and also helps market their debt. Additionally, the cost
savings from such a refinancing may not be worth the litigation hassle or
expense. USDA financings are constrained to low-population areas and have
extended repayment periods so that rural units can afford the project.323 This
is another way to say that the units that could least afford to litigate the issue
are the units affected by the guideline.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a simple solution to a mounting problem of localgovernment fiscal insolvency in the United States.324 It supports the
nationwide application of the multifaceted approach taken by North Carolina’s
Local Government Commission, but only as long as the application does not
extend its reach further than necessary to non-taxing governmental authorities
or to the use of economic-development incentives.

These guidelines are fairly new and well intentioned. However, a statute that says the
LGC will not approve state refinancing of USDA debt would be a much better vehicle and
would remove ambiguity regarding the “guideline.” One need only look to the LGC’s success
in gaining oversight of water-sewer systems, which included definitions of “quick ratios” and
other financial indicators, in allowing the LGC to assume control of near-insolvent water and
sewer systems. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-181. The legislation granting this new authority passed
without a single vote against the bill. Senate Bill 207/S.L. 2013-150: Maintaining Water and
Sewer Fiscal Health, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=S207 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
323. See Water and Waste Disposal Guaranteed Loans, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., http://
www.rurdev.usda.gov/UWP-dispguaranteedloan.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
324. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Exerting state control at the expense of local governments is
extraordinarily difficult and comes with political hurdles, but North Carolina’s
experience has shown that such a system keeps local-government interest rates
low and helps avert fiscal crises. However, as this Article also explains, there
is a limit to the control that states should exert in these matters: local
governments need the flexibility to make decisions to positively affect their
communities. If a local government wishes to take on debt, it should also be
allowed to do so, as long as the local-government unit has both the political
will and financial capability—not necessarily because the project is popular in
the rest of the state. The current structure of the LGC provides what this
Article argues is a useful model for other states to emulate.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/5

54

